University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2007

Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm
Alexandra B. Klass

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Klass, Alexandra B., "Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm" (2007). Minnesota Law Review. 573.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/573

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

KLASS_6FMT

12/13/2007 9:36 AM

Article

Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm
Alexandra B. Klass†
I.
II.

III.

IV.

Purpose and Implementation of Punitive Damages ...... 90
The Supreme Court’s Journey from Bystander to
Policeman: Narrow Cases and Broad Principles ............ 94
A. The Journey .............................................................. 94
B. Reasons for the Journey ........................................... 98
Recognizing and Valuing Harm .................................... 105
A. The Intentional Tort Cases Post-BMW .................. 105
1. Intentional Trespass Cases ............................... 105
2. Defamation and Civil Rights Cases .................. 107
B. The Environmental Harm Cases ........................... 111
1. Undervaluing Environmental Harm ................ 112
2. Recognizing Environmental Harm ................... 118
C. Exploring Standing and Valuation Difficulties in
Environmental Harm Cases ................................... 126
1. Standing Limitations for Valuing Harm .......... 128
2. Valuation Limitations ....................................... 134
D. Comparing and Contrasting the Intentional Tort
and Environmental Harm Cases ............................ 138
Valuing Harm and Applying Ratios ............................. 142
A. Awarding Punitive Damages in Intentional Tort
Cases with Small or Nominal Damages ................ 143
B. Awarding Punitive Damages in Environmental
Harm Cases ............................................................. 144
1. Valuing Environmental Harm in the Absence
of a State or Federal Government Plaintiff ...... 145

† Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
Thanks to David Adelman, Jennifer Arlen, Daniel Farber, Bradley Karkkainen, Brett McDonnell, David Prince, Sidney Shapiro, Catherine Sharkey, David Weissbrodt, and Susan Wolfe for their valuable comments and suggestions
on earlier versions of this Article. I also benefited greatly from comments received at faculty workshops at the University of Minnesota Law School. Copyright © 2007 by Alexandra B. Klass.

83

KLASS_6FMT

84

12/13/2007 9:36 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:83

2. Recognizing Unvalued Environmental Harm
Where Valuation Is Difficult ............................. 149
C. Apportioning Punitive Damages in
Environmental Harm Cases ................................... 153
Conclusion ................................................................................ 159
In February 1994, a mobile home company, Steenberg
Homes, arranged to deliver a mobile home to a customer in
Manitowoc County, Wisconsin.1 The easiest way to deliver the
home was to cut across the neighbors’ property.2 The neighbors
who owned the property, Harvey and Lois Jacque, however,
had made it clear to the company that they would not give the
company permission to cross their land.3 The Jacques were
sensitive about letting others use their land because they had
lost property valued at over $10,000 to other neighbors in an
adverse possession action in the mid-1980s.4 Despite the Jacques’ express denial of permission, the company deliberately
crossed the Jacques’ land to deliver the home. The Jacques
sued the company for trespass, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.5 A jury ultimately awarded the Jacques $1 in
nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.6
In Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., a federal
jury in Georgia awarded twenty-three landowners of sixteen
different properties $47,000 in compensatory damages and $45
million in punitive damages.7 The defendant in the case, Combustion Engineering, operated a mine that polluted streams
running through the plaintiffs’ properties.8 For several years
the defendant failed to prevent acidic water emanating from its
property from entering the streams.9 The trial court reduced
the punitive damages award first to $15 million and then, after

1. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997).
2. Id. (“Steenberg determined that the easiest route to deliver the mobile
home was across the Jacques’ land.”).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 158.
7. No. CIV. A. CV 191-178, 1997 WL 423108, at *4 (S.D. Ga. June 9,
1997), vacated in part, 170 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1999).
8. Id. at *2–3 (describing the “most egregious” conduct as the failure of
Combustion Engineering to do more to prevent the acidic water problem).
9. Id. at *2–3; see also Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d
1320, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999).
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appeal and remand, to $4.35 million.10 The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the reduced punitive damages
award.11
At first glance, these two cases do not appear to have much
in common. The Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., case was a
dispute between a small company and individual landowners
over the ability of the landowners to exclude others from their
property.12 The damages were nominal and the punitive damages were fairly modest for an award against a corporate defendant.13 The conflict affected virtually no one other than the
litigants. By contrast, the Johansen case involved a dispute between a large mining company and twenty-three landowners of
sixteen different properties.14 Although this was a private civil
suit, the defendant’s actions caused damage not only to the
plaintiffs themselves but also to public natural resources (the
streams).15 Further, the punitive damages award was substantial, even after the court’s reduction.16
Despite these differences, the two cases are similar in
many ways. First, the harm to the plaintiffs comprised only a
portion of the defendant’s total wrongdoing sought to be punished through punitive damages. In both cases, the defendant
caused harm that went uncompensated in the civil action. In
Jacque, the damages awarded did not compensate for the violation of the plaintiffs’ right to exclude others from their property, nor did they vindicate society’s interest in protecting that
right; such harm was never translated into monetary terms.
Similarly, in Johansen, there was no valuation of damage to
the streams or to the public’s right in those resources. The
plaintiffs’ compensation was limited to diminution in value of
their private properties, which resulted in most of the plaintiffs
receiving only $3000 in compensatory damages.17
Second, both cases were litigated in the shadow of the Supreme Court’s efforts to place constitutional due process limits
on punitive damages, efforts which began in earnest with its
10. Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1327.
11. Id. at 1339.
12. 563 N.W.2d 154, 156–58 (Wis. 1997).
13. See id. at 156.
14. Johansen, 1997 WL 423108, at *1.
15. See id.
16. See Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1340 (upholding a punitive damages award
of $4.35 million).
17. Johansen, 1997 WL 423108, at *4.
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1996 decision in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.18 In
BMW, the Supreme Court for the first time placed substantive
due process limits on punitive damages awards in civil cases.19
The Court also set forth three “guideposts” for assessing the
constitutionality of such damages awards: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio between
the punitive damages awarded and the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.20
In 2003, the Court went further and warned that few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages would satisfy due process.21 The Court, relying on
BMW, stated, however, that awards exceeding a single-digit ratio “may” comport with due process if an egregious act results
in only a small amount of economic damages, if the injury is
hard to detect, or if the monetary value of noneconomic harm is
difficult to determine.22 The Court reasoned that the presumptive ratio would ensure that “the measure of punishment is
both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to
the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.”23
This Article proposes that, in applying the constitutionally
based single-digit ratio presumption, courts must be attentive
to unvalued harm. Where courts ignore this unvalued harm, it
can result in a mechanical and inappropriate reduction of punitive damages awards on due process grounds. Both the intentional trespass claim in Jacque and the environmental harm
claim in Johansen meet the Supreme Court’s standard for departure from a single-digit ratio: in both cases, there is a strong
argument that either the defendant’s conduct resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages (nominal damages in Jacque) or that the monetary value of noneconomic harm is difficult to determine (harm to the streams in Johansen).24

18. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
19. Id. at 585.
20. Id. at 575.
21. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 426.
24. See id. at 425 (noting that damages may comport with due process
where an egregious act results in a small amount of economic damages or
where noneconomic harm might be difficult to determine).
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Although both types of cases present circumstances justifying departure from the ratio presumption, a close review of the
intentional tort and environmental harm cases decided since
BMW show that courts have often applied the ratio requirement very differently in the two types of cases. In the intentional tort cases with small or nominal damages, like Jacque,
as well as in cases involving defamation and civil rights violations, lower courts more freely disregard single-digit ratios.25
Courts reason that, because compensatory damages in these
cases are often nominal or very small, higher ratios are needed
to deter and punish reprehensible conduct that results in harm
to the plaintiff beyond any monetary loss.26 In all of these intentional tort cases, the plaintiff ’s rights are violated, but no
valuation of that violation occurs in assessing compensatory
damages.27
Just as damages awards in the intentional tort cases contain no valuation of the interference with person or property,
harm to natural resources also constitutes harm that is difficult
to measure easily in monetary terms. More often, however,
courts in environmental harm cases brought by private parties
fail to recognize that compensatory damages do not measure a
large portion of environmental harm. This failure results because in private party environmental harm cases, the compensatory damages frequently are limited to cleanup costs or diminution in value to property, and there is no named plaintiff
with standing to obtain compensation for damage to “public”
natural resources or ecosystems.28 As a result, compensatory

25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See M. STUART MADDEN & GERALD W. BOSTON, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 66–68 (3d ed. 2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821C (1979)) (stating that the law has been slow to recognize the
right of private persons to bring actions for public nuisance to recover for environmental harm without a showing of “special injury” because, in part, the
theory remains that only sovereigns should maintain actions for public harm);
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 74–75 (5th ed.
2006) (discussing the limitations of private nuisance claims brought to recover
for environmental harms, noting that class actions have “not played a significant role in redressing environmental damage,” and concluding that even
when the aggregate damage is significant, the damage to individual victims
“may be insufficient to make a lawsuit worthwhile”); see also infra Part III.C
(exploring the standing and valuation difficulties in environmental harm cases).
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damages in such cases do not adequately reflect the actual
harm or damage to natural resources.
Unlike in the intentional tort cases, many courts deciding
private party environmental harm cases mechanically reduce
the jury’s punitive damages award to reach a single-digit ratio.29 In doing so, courts fail to recognize the nonmonetary
harm to the environment that was not included in the compensatory damages award. This Article argues that lower courts
should more fully address those circumstances where the judicial system fails to monetarily account for certain types of
harm, whether the harm occurs to public resources, other public rights, or certain private interests. The environmental harm
cases are simply an illustration of how the ratio guidepost has
been tied too closely to a compensatory damages award rather
than to the total harm caused by the defendant. This leads to
cases where punitive damages are lowered excessively and thus
not allowed to serve their primary purposes of punishment and
deterrence. Notably, despite the significant attention given to
punitive damages in general, over the past ten years, neither
the Supreme Court nor legal scholars have given much, if any,
attention to the problem of valuing harm.
Part I of this Article explores the purposes of punitive
damages and the factors juries consider in awarding punitive
damages. This Part explains that, while punishment and deterrence are universally cited as the two purposes behind imposing punitive damages, such damages were historically recognized as also encompassing certain types of harm that the civil
justice system did not “count” in computing compensatory
damages. Part II traces the Supreme Court’s relatively short
journey from being uninvolved in policing state court punitive
damages awards to its creation of today’s constitutional due
process standards. This Part shows that the Court’s new constitutional ratio presumption is based, in large part, not only on
the perceived problem of large punitive damages awards, but
also on excessive nonpecuniary damages awards that serve to
inflate both punitive damages awards and overall awards.
Part III contains a review of intentional tort and environmental harm cases issued since the Supreme Court’s 1996
BMW v. Gore decision. The analysis in this Part reveals that
29. The court in Johansen avoided this error and allowed a ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 100-to-1. Johansen v. Combustion
Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999); see infra Part III.B.1 (discussing cases that reduced punitive damages to a single-digit ratio).
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courts depart from single-digit ratios in the intentional tort
cases without much difficulty, justifying their departure with
rationales of punishment, deterrence, and the absence of large
overall awards. By contrast, although the environmental harm
cases in which the court awards punitive damages involve
many of the same reasons to depart from single-digit ratios,
courts have more difficulty identifying those reasons in such
cases. The reason for this difficulty is because the compensatory damages in these cases are often large, although, I argue,
not sufficiently large to reflect the total harm the defendant
caused or could potentially have caused to the affected natural
resources. As a result, courts in the environmental harm cases
struggle to apply the ratio and ensure an adequate penalty for
the defendant’s misconduct. This Part concludes with an analysis of the similarities and differences between the intentional
tort cases on the one hand and the environmental harm cases
on the other. The similarities support rejecting a mechanical
approach to the ratio guidepost in both types of cases, while the
differences demonstrate the need to adopt distinct approaches
to the total awards.
Part IV uses the cases discussed in Part III to create a
framework within which courts can either attempt to value (or
at least recognize) harm that goes unmeasured in calculating
compensatory damages or, justify ratios that exceed single digits. This Part shows that courts in the intentional tort cases
should and do recognize that there is no valuation of the invasion of the plaintiff ’s right in the calculation of compensatory
damages, and allow recovery of punitive damages beyond single-digit ratios. This Part then suggests a different approach
for the environmental harm cases. In those cases, courts can attempt to value harm to the environment beyond the plaintiff’s
compensatory damages, as a component of the reprehensibility
of the misconduct. If such information is available, a singledigit ratio can be appropriate.
Where valuation measures for environmental harm are not
available, courts should use the same approach applied in the
intentional tort cases with small or nominal damages. This
would help courts to recognize that harm to natural resources
exists that cannot be valued, of a type which allows courts to
depart from single-digit ratios. In both types of environmental
harm situations, however, the full amount of punitive damages
should not necessarily go to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff
will be paying for the environmental restoration. If the plaintiff
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will not be paying for the restoration, some portion of the punitive damages should go to the government or nonprofit organizations in an amount to be identified by state legislatures or
the courts. The remaining portion would be awarded to the
plaintiff, along with attorney’s fees, to create sufficient incentives for bringing such suits. This “split-recovery” approach can
be implemented by state legislatures or by courts using their
inherent common law authority.
The proposed framework relies on the flexibility that exists
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and suggests some refinements. Allowing higher punitive damages awards in environmental harm cases (either through a full valuation of harm
or a departure from a single-digit ratio) fills a gap that today’s
environmental regulatory enforcement system is unable to address. In this way, civil tort law can continue to play an optimal
role in both environmental protection efforts and in other cases
without the necessity of a government plaintiff that is willing
or available to pursue defendants who have engaged in wrongdoing that justifies punitive damages.
I. PURPOSE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory
or nominal damages, awarded against a defendant to punish
him or her for outrageous conduct and to deter the defendant or
others similarly situated from engaging in such conduct in the
future.30 Commentators and courts generally are in agreement
that the twin purposes of punitive damages are punishment
and deterrence.31 According to the Supreme Court, although
compensatory damages and punitive damages are usually
awarded at the same time in our judicial system, they serve dif-

30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
31. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
432 (2001); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that the main purposes of punitive damages are to punish the defendant and deter both the defendant and others
from acting in a similar manner); LINDA L. SCHLUETER, 1 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
§ 1.4(B), at 16–17 (5th ed. 2005) (observing that the most widely accepted purposes of punitive damages have been punishment and deterrence); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 356–
57 (2003) (stating that courts and academic commentators agree that punishment (or retribution) and deterrence are the two prevailing justifications for
punitive damages).
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ferent purposes.32 Compensatory damages “are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason
of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.”33 Punitive damages, by
contrast, serve the broader functions of deterrence and retribution.34 Specifically, a state may allow imposition of punitive
damages through its common law or by statute to further its
legitimate interest in “punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”35 Because the purposes of punitive damages
are to punish and deter wrongful conduct, states generally require, by statute or common law, that the defendant’s wrongful
act be done intentionally or with willful indifference, deliberate
disregard, malice, or a similar state of mind.36
Today’s apparent unanimity regarding the purposes of punitive damages has not always existed. Historically, at least
four other purposes have been identified, such as (1) preserving
the peace; (2) inducing private law enforcement; (3) compensating victims of otherwise uncompensable losses; and (4) paying
the plaintiff ’s attorney’s fees.37 Indeed, even today in a few
states, the stated purpose of punitive damages is to provide additional compensation to the injured plaintiff.38 Other states
justify this additional compensation as a bounty for plaintiffs to
bring suits acting as private attorneys general.39 By allowing
plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in appropriate cases,
plaintiffs will have an incentive to fulfill important societal ob32. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
33. Id. (citing Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 903, at 453–54 (1979)).
34. Id. (citing Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)).
35. Id.
36. SCHLUETER, supra note 31, § 4.2(A)(2), at 159–62 (discussing the
pleading requirements and the basis for a claim in a punitive damages case).
37. 2A STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:46, at
167 (2003).
38. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 2, at 9 (noting that some decisions
have mentioned “reimbursing the plaintiff for elements of damage which are
not legally compensable, such as wounded feelings or the expenses of suit” as
an additional purpose of punitive damages); SPEISER ET AL., supra note 37
(noting that punitive damages are intended, in part, to “reimburse for losses
too remote to be considered elements of strict compensation” (citing Hofer v.
Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex. 1984))).
39. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 37, § 8.46, at 169–70 (citing Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1560–61 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Miss., Inc. v. Maas, 516 So. 2d 495, 497 (Miss. 1990) (awarding punitive damages to plaintiffs acting as “private attorneys general” to reward the plaintiffs’
public service and encourage litigation to address injustices)).
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jectives by bringing a civil enforcement action for serious misconduct.40 This is particularly true where the prospective compensatory recovery is low or the expected cost of litigation is
high.41 Thus, although punishment and deterrence are the
most-cited justifications for imposing punitive damages, historic uses of punitive damages both to compensate plaintiffs for
otherwise uncompensable harm and encourage private attorney
general actions also are present in the case law.
The instructions juries receive regarding the factors they
can consider in awarding punitive damages will vary depending
on a state’s goals. In many states, juries are instructed to consider the reprehensibility of the misconduct, the profitability of
the misconduct, the duration of the misconduct, the defendant’s
concealment of the misconduct, the degree of the defendant’s
awareness of its misconduct, the defendant’s attitude upon discovering the misconduct, the defendant’s financial condition,42
the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed as a
result of the misconduct, and the relationship between the
amount of punitive damages and the damage actually suffered
by the plaintiff.43

40. Id. at 170 (citing Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Me. 1985)
(noting that the “potential for recovering an exemplary award” provides an incentive for “private civil enforcement of society’s rules against serious misconduct”)).
41. Id. (citing Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1358).
42. Although the Supreme Court has warned that the wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional award, it has recognized
that it is not inappropriate for states to allow juries to account for the defendant’s wealth when assessing punitive damages, as many states do. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427–28 (2003) (citing
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991) (finding that
Alabama’s standards for reviewing punitive damages awards, which allow a
defendant’s wealth to be one of many considerations, sufficiently constrain
jury discretion); see 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1066–68 (2001) (listing a defendant’s wealth as one of the factors courts and legislatures present
as a basis for assessing the amount of punitive damages). The rationale for allowing juries to consider the defendant’s wealth in assessing punitive damages, but not compensatory damages, is that it obviously takes more money to
punish a wealthy defendant and deter future misconduct than it does a defendant of modest means. See id. at 1068; infra notes 335–39 and accompanying
text.
43. 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, at 1066–67 (listing the “traditional” factors
for assessing punitive damages); SCHLUETER, supra note 31, § 5.6(F)(4), at
338–40 (citing the provisions of a California model jury instruction); Rachel M.
Janutis, Reforming Reprehensibility: The Continued Viability of Multiple Punitive Damages After State Farm v. Campbell, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1465,
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Beyond the purposes of punitive damages, there has been
much recent debate about their frequency, their rate of increase, and their overall impact on the tort system and society.44 In an effort to gather data on this topic, several studies
have attempted to assess the impact of punitive damages. According to six major studies reviewing punitive damages
awards since 1985, juries have awarded punitive damages in
approximately 2%–9% of all cases where plaintiffs have won.45
Assuming an average success rate of 50% for plaintiffs, these
statistics mean that punitive damages were awarded in 1%–
4.5% of all civil trials. Although this number may not seem significant, recent punitive damages awards in the millions and
billions of dollars, particularly against tobacco companies and
other product manufacturers, have made headlines in recent
years.46 As a result, the issue of punitive damages is a significant topic among tort scholars, interest groups, and state legislatures.47
Despite the increasing size of the awards, until recently,
state courts reviewed punitive damages awards without regard
to federal constitutional concerns. Now, however, both trial and
appellate courts must engage in a de novo substantive due
process review of punitive damages under the United States

1470–76 (2004) (setting forth jury instructions on punitive damages in numerous states).
44. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
45. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 957, 964–65 (2007) (summarizing numerous empirical studies of punitive damages since the 1980s); see Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Relation Between Punitive and Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the
Mass of Awards, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., forthcoming Nov. 2007)
(manuscript at 5–21, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=929565) (analyzing
various data sets on punitive damages from 1985 through 2004).
46. W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1405, 1405–08, 1428 tbl.1 (2004) (discussing the media attention given to
punitive damages awards, the interest of tort reformers, and the rise of
“blockbuster” awards, ranging from $100 million to over $1 billion); see Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1167–68, 1171 (Or. 2006) (affirming
a punitive damages award of $79.5 million against Philip Morris based on a
plaintiff smoker’s compensatory damages award of $521,485), vacated sub
nom. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007); infra note 83 (discussing the activity of state legislatures and tort reformers).
47. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 46, at 1405 (“Punitive damages represent
the most visible symptom of the ills of the U.S. tort system.”); infra note 82
(citing debates over whether punitive damages really are a problem in today’s
tort system).
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Constitution.48 Part II sets forth briefly the current constitutional structure for awarding and reviewing punitive damages
with a focus on some of the societal factors underlying the Supreme Court’s foray into this area. This review shows that this
sea change in punitive damages jurisprudence arose predominantly from cases involving product liability claims with large
personal injury components, and from consumer fraud cases
involving nationwide misconduct. Because these cases involve
little dispute over whether the plaintiff can quantify and recover for the actual and potential damage flowing from the wrongful conduct, the presumptive single-digit ratio may be appropriate. Many lower courts, however, have not always focused
adequately on how the new due process rules can or should apply to cases in which total harm is difficult to value and thus
difficult to recover as compensatory damages.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S JOURNEY FROM
BYSTANDER TO POLICEMAN: NARROW CASES AND
BROAD PRINCIPLES
A. THE JOURNEY
Prior to 1996, the Supreme Court had never used substantive due process as a ground to invalidate as excessive a state
court punitive damages award.49 The Court began moving in
that direction beginning in 1989, however, in Browning-Ferris
Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.50 In that case, the Court
rejected a challenge to a punitive damages verdict under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.51 The Court
did suggest, though, that a state’s imposition of punitive damages might violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
48. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
443 (2001) (holding that appellate courts should apply a de novo standard in
reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damages awards).
49. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599–600 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority’s decision represents the first instance of
the Court’s invalidation of a punitive damages award as unreasonably large);
In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting
that as of the time of the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, the Supreme Court had
never invalidated a punitive damages award on grounds that the size of the
award violated due process), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76
U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276).
50. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
51. Id. at 275–76.
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Amendment.52 At the time of the Browning-Ferris decision, it
was settled that there were procedural due process limitations
on punitive damages, but less certainty existed regarding
whether punitive damages were subject to substantive due
process limitations beyond the rational basis review that applied to legislative penalties.53
The Court squarely addressed the substantive due process
issue for the first time in 1991 in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip.54 In Haslip, the Court explained that it had historically upheld punitive damages awarded by juries pursuant
to state common law.55 However, the Court made clear that
jury discretion in awarding punitive damages was not unlimited. The opinion emphasized that the Court was under a constitutional obligation to review the reasonableness of the award
and the adequateness of judicial guidance to the jury in making
the award.56 The Court held that the jury instructions were
adequate and that the amount of punitive damages was not excessive, even though it was more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages and twenty times the amount of the
plaintiff ’s out-of-pocket expenses.57
The Court again addressed constitutional limits on punitive damages in 1993 in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.58 In upholding a punitive damages award that, on
its face, was 526 times the amount of compensatory damages,59
the Court reasoned that, in assessing punitive damages, it was
appropriate to consider the potential harm to the plaintiff and
other possible victims that could have resulted from the defendant’s wrongful conduct.60 Thus, the punitive damages award
did not “‘jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.’”61
52. Id. at 276. The Court did not reach the issue of due process limitations
on punitive damages because it found that the petitioners had not properly
preserved the issue for appeal. Id. at 276–77.
53. Id.; see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–55
(1993) (stating that the respondents do not dispute that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes a substantive limit on the amount of a punitive damages
award but that they contend the Court’s scrutiny should be the same rational
basis scrutiny appropriate for reviewing state economic legislation).
54. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1991).
55. Id. at 15–18.
56. Id. at 18–19.
57. Id. at 23.
58. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
59. Id. at 459.
60. Id. at 461–62.
61. Id. at 462 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).

KLASS_6FMT

96

12/13/2007 9:36 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:83

These cases culminated in the Court’s decision in BMW,62
where the Court for the first time struck down a punitive damage verdict as excessive on due process grounds.63 The plaintiff
in BMW had purchased a new BMW automobile that had been
repainted without his knowledge prior to sale to hide a surface
defect in the car.64 In the plaintiff ’s suit for fraud, the jury
awarded $4000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages (later reduced to $2 million) based on evidence
that the defendant’s fraudulent practice was widespread.65 In
holding that the punitive damages award violated due process,
the Court established its now-famous three guideposts courts
now must use to provide a constitutional review of punitive
damages: (1) the reprehensibility of the misconduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages imposed and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.66 The
Court held the reprehensibility guidepost was the most important, and focused on assessing the flagrancy or enormity of the
misconduct.67
The Court reasoned that the ratio requirement ensured
that the actual and potential harm to the plaintiff reasonably
related to the penalty imposed on the defendant.68 The Court
cited to early English statutes authorizing double, treble, or
quadruple damages for particular wrongs as the historic
grounding for a numerical relationship between compensatory
and punitive damages.69 The Court recognized, however, that
“low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a
higher ratio” if a particularly egregious act resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages.70 The Court also acknowledged that a higher ratio might be justified where “the injury is
hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm
might have been difficult to determine.”71 To round out the
three guideposts, the Court stated that the focus on civil sanc62. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
63. See id. at 585.
64. Id. at 563 & n.1.
65. Id. at 564–65. The state supreme court subsequently reduced the punitive damages award to $2 million. Id. at 567.
66. Id. at 575.
67. Id. at 575–76.
68. Id. at 580–81 & n.33.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 582.
71. Id.
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tions for comparative misconduct was to ensure the defendant
was on notice that its conduct could subject it to a significant
penalty.72
In 2003, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, the Court retained the BMW framework’s focus on
reprehensibility of harm, appropriate ratios, and available civil
penalties.73 In State Farm, the plaintiffs brought claims of bad
faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
against their automobile insurer for mishandling their legal defense in an accident claim.74 The jury awarded the plaintiffs
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.75 The Supreme Court struck down the jury’s
punitive damages award as unconstitutional.76 In reaching the
decision, the Court provided more specific limits on the ratio
between compensatory and punitive damages. While in BMW
the Court merely set forth the ratio as an important guidepost,
in State Farm it went further.
The Court expressed its reluctance to “identify concrete
constitutional limits” on the ratio between harm or potential
harm to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.77 It
went on to say, though, that the Court’s jurisprudence and
principles demonstrate that in practice “few awards exceeding
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages” will satisfy due process.78 While the Court retained some
flexibility in the ratio test consistent with its statement in
BMW,79 it warned that, when compensatory damages are substantial, “a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory
damages, can reach the outermost limits of the due process
guarantee.”80
The Court’s discussion of the ratio requirement in BMW
and State Farm recognizes that punitive damages should be
based on total harm where the compensatory damages award
72. Id. at 583–84.
73. 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).
74. Id. at 413–14.
75. Id. at 415. The trial court reduced the punitive damages award but
the state supreme court reinstated it. Id.
76. Id. at 418.
77. Id. at 424.
78. Id. at 425.
79. Id. (reaffirming language in BMW that a larger ratio might be constitutional if an “egregious act” results in a small amount of economic harm, if
the injury is hard to detect, or if the monetary value is difficult to determine).
80. Id.
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does not include all harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct. The Court, however, provided little detail as to which circumstances would justify a disproportionate punitive damages
award. This can be explained, perhaps, by the specific concerns
the Court sought to address in both BMW and particularly in
State Farm. These concerns and the Court’s response to them
in its series of punitive damage cases are discussed in the next
Section.
B. REASONS FOR THE JOURNEY
This Section proposes that the Court’s single-digit ratio
presumption is driven not only by concerns of out-of-control
punitive damages awards, but also by concerns of excessive,
nonpecuniary compensatory damages awards in cases involving
nationwide harm.81 As shown below, the Court’s majority and
dissenting opinions throughout these cases express fears of
large verdicts and excessive compensatory damages, in addition
to excessive punitive damages. These concerns reflect the
heightened public debates regarding punitive damages and tort
law. During this period, reports of excessive awards in products
liability, personal injury, and other tort lawsuits had increased,
and such awards generated significant amounts of academic
writing and news stories that continue to this day.82 State leg81. Pecuniary damages compensate the plaintiff for the economic consequences of the injury such as medical expenses, lost earnings, and loss of custodial care. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374–75 (N.Y. 1989).
Nonpecuniary damages compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering, loss of
enjoyment of life, and other physical and emotional consequences of the injury.
See id.
82. Howard A. Denemark, Seeking Greater Fairness When Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 931, 939–40 (2002) (stating that both the public and the courts are being
misled by “[p]opular press reports [that] erroneously claim that the United
States is in the midst of an unprecedented explosion of litigation with the indiscriminate use of punitive damages forcing legitimate enterprises out of existence”); Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Justice System Real
or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1129–32 (2005) (arguing that recovery for noneconomic damages, such as awards for pain and suffering, “are
starting to supplement punitive damages awards as a source of ‘jackpot justice’ damages for plaintiffs”); Sharkey, supra note 31, at 349 (“Large punitive
damages awards get attention.”); Viscusi, supra note 46, at 1405 (“Punitive
damages represent the most visible symptom of the ills of the U.S. tort system.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries Decide?, 82
TEX. L. REV. 381, 381–82 (2003) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002)) (describing the proliferation of
recent academic work on the jury’s role in determining punitive damages, and
noting the Supreme Court and lower courts’ reliance on this academic work);
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islatures also have responded to this “crisis” by enacting significant tort reform measures which include placing caps on both
punitive damages and noneconomic damages.83 It is clear from
many of the Court’s opinions that it wished to address the perceived need to control excessive verdicts generally in addition
to punitive damages specifically. These concerns appeared first
in dissent in the early punitive damages cases, but came to ultimately underlie the majority opinion in State Farm.
First, in Browning-Ferris, Justice O’Connor declared that
“[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.”84 She cited
several then-recent cases to illustrate a trend of new, multimillion dollar awards.85 She also relied on various amicus briefs
warning that the threat of such “enormous awards” was detrimentally affecting the research and development of new products, pharmaceutical drugs, vaccines, and motor vehicles.86
Justice O’Connor’s concerns were not limited to the punitive
Catherine M. Sharkey & Jonathan Klick, The Fungibility of Damage Awards:
Punitive Damage Caps and Substitution 1 (Columbia Law Sch., Columbia Law
and Econ. Working Paper No. 298; Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Law and
Econ. Paper No. 912,256, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=912256
(noting that blockbuster punitive awards tend to dominate the academic and
popular debates and have fueled recent legislative efforts to cap or constrain
such awards); see also DAVID C. JOHNSON, THE ATTACK ON TRIAL LAWYERS
AND TORT LAW 3–9 (2003), available at http://commonwealinstitute.org/
reports/TortReport.pdf (describing the right-wing tort reform agenda that is
focused on achieving judicial and legislative reforms in limiting punitive damages and noneconomic harm); Eisenberg et al., supra note 45 (manuscript at
3–4) (concluding that empirical data show that punitive damages have not increased over time, are rarely awarded, and are most frequently awarded
where intentional misbehavior occurred); American Tort Reform Association,
About ATRA, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) (stating
that the ATRA supports an aggressive civil justice reform agenda that includes, among others, limits on punitive damages and limits on noneconomic
damages).
83. JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 17 (citing the success of tort reform advocates in 2002 and 2003 to legislate state punitive damage caps in Alaska, Mississippi, and Texas, and noneconomic damage caps in Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia); Sharkey & Klick, supra note
82, app. A, at 31 (showing twenty-one states with punitive damages caps, with
most enacted beginning in the mid-1980s and through the 1990s); id. app. B,
at 33 (showing seven states with caps on noneconomic damages). In a few
states, courts have invalidated noneconomic damage caps as unconstitutional.
Id.
84. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Brief of the Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n. & Am. Med. Ass’n as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Browning-Ferris Indus. Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (No. 88-556), 1989 WL 1127717, at *5–23).
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damages at issue in the case before the Court, but related to
the broader effect of large verdicts on technological and economic development.87
Justice O’Connor again dissented from the majority opinion in Haslip, which upheld the punitive damages award at issue as within constitutional boundaries.88 Her opinion called
for more stringent constitutional limits because juries use punitive damages to “target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute wealth. Multimillion dollar losses are inflicted on a whim.”89 Emphasizing
this point, Justice O’Connor noted “an explosion in the frequency and size of punitive damages awards”90 that appear to be
“‘limited only by the ability of lawyers to string zeros together
in drafting a complaint.’”91 Justice O’Connor declared a need to
reevaluate the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence, in part
because of the changes in the availability of compensatory
damages. In the past, punitive damages were awarded to fill
the gap “when compensatory damages were not available for
pain, humiliation, and other forms of intangible injury.”92 With
the changes in the law, however, punitive damages no longer
appeared necessary to fill the compensatory gap.93
Justice O’Connor’s opinions in these cases, particularly in
Haslip, show a significant concern with the ability of the civil
jury system to award noneconomic damages (whether compensatory or punitive) that are not arbitrary and unreasonable.
The criticism is not limited to punitive damages claims but appears to extend to large verdicts generally, increases in compensatory damages, and the effect of mass tort and product liability litigation. These broad concerns did not surface expressly
in BMW, but made their way into Justice Stevens’ majority
opinion in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc.94 In that case, the Court held for the first time that appel87. Id.
88. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
89. Id. at 43.
90. Id. at 62.
91. Id. at 62 (quoting Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, 872 F.2d 312, 315
(9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring)).
92. Id. at 61.
93. See id. at 61 (citing KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.3(A)
(1980); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517,
519–20 (1957)).
94. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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late courts should apply a de novo standard in reviewing the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards.95 The Court held
that, unlike the measure of actual damages, the level of punitive damages is not a “fact” that is “tried by the jury.”96
In support of that proposition, the Court relied on the
changing role of punitive damages and compensation for harm
in the civil justice system. According to the Court, until well into the nineteenth century, punitive damages “compensate[d] for
intangible injuries” because recovery for such injuries “was not
otherwise available under the narrow conception of compensatory damages prevalent at the time.”97 As an example, the court
noted that plaintiffs are generally allowed to recover pain and
suffering damages in a compensatory award, whereas such
harm was previously compensated by punitive damages.98 The
increasing ability of plaintiffs to recover damages that historically were not subject to valuation for purposes of recovery
eliminated the compensatory role of punitive damages. According to the Court, their changed role rendered them “less factual” and thus subject to a different standard of review than
that applied to compensatory damages.99 The Court also reasoned that the new, more limited purpose of punitive damages
justified closer constitutional scrutiny of such awards.100
95. Id. at 443.
96. Id. at 437 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 459 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 437 n.11. According to other sources, courts have allowed recovery for pain and suffering associated with physical injuries since ancient
times, but it was not until well into the twentieth century that courts routinely began allowing recovery for pure emotional distress and other nonpecuniary
damages without physical impact. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 136, 141–46 (1992) (tracing the history of the judicial recognition of
emotional distress claims); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The Pain and Suffering of
Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 888 (1994) (stating that claims for nonmarket losses are
far greater today than they were under traditional common law and that
claims for pure emotional distress were not regularly permitted until well into
the 1900s).
98. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437 n.11.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 437–38. But see Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages
Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 164 (2003) (arguing that the Court made a historical error in Cooper Industries when it posited that punitive damages served
primarily as a compensatory function in the early years of American tort law).
Even if the Court was incorrect that the primary purpose of punitive damages
in early tort law was to compensate for losses that were not previously recognized as a category of compensatory damages but now are, the fact remains
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Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the Court’s bright-line
rule. She questioned the Court’s conclusion that punitive damages were less “factual” than nonpecuniary damages, which are
just as difficult to quantify.101 She contended that punitive
damages are “not unlike” the measure of actual damages suffered in a noneconomic injury: “One million dollars’ worth of
pain and suffering does not exist as a ‘fact’ in the world any
more or less than one million dollars’ worth of moral outrage.”102 Thus, Justice Ginsburg saw no legal basis for applying
one standard of review to pain and suffering damages and
another to punitive damages.
Finally, in State Farm, the majority questioned whether
punitive damages continued to serve any purpose. In justifying
its invalidation of a punitive damages award that exceeded the
compensatory damages award by 145-to-1, the Court emphasized that compensatory damages in the case were “substantial” ($1 million).103 The Court believed there was “likely” an
overlap between the punitive damages award and the compensatory damages award because much of the compensatory
award compensated for emotional distress caused by the outrage and humiliation the plaintiffs suffered.104 The Court went
on to cite authority arguing that compensatory damages of this
type already contain a punitive element, and stated that there
is “‘no clear line of demarcation between punishment and compensation’” in a case of this kind.105 Thus, the Court further limited the role of punitive damages by questioning their role as
a punitive measure in cases involving awards of nonpecuniary
damages. Following its reasoning in Cooper Industries, the
Court found the more limited role justified greater scrutiny of
such awards.
The Court has continued to narrow the role of punitive
damages as evidenced by its most recent case, Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, which was issued in February 2007.106 In that
that compensation was and can still be a component of punitive damages. See,
e.g., Sharkey & Klick, supra note 82 (suggesting that punitive damages and
noneconomic compensatory damages are more fungible than has been acknowledged); supra text accompanying notes 37–39 (discussing the historic
purposes of punitive damages).
101. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 446–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003).
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c (1979)).
106. 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1057 (2007).
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case, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a jury award to the
wife of a smoker in a wrongful death claim for fraud and negligence.107 The jury found that Philip Morris had engaged in a
publicity campaign to undermine published concerns about the
dangers of smoking.108 The jury awarded the plaintiff $79.5
million in punitive damages, based on a total compensatory
award of $821,485.80 ($21,485.80 in economic damages and
$800,000 in noneconomic damages), resulting in a ratio of
roughly 100-to-1.109 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant raised two issues. First, the defendant argued that the
jury’s award violated due process because there was a “significant likelihood” that a portion of the punitive damages award
represented punishment for harm to nonparties rather than
solely for harm or potential harm to the plaintiff.110 Second, the
defendant argued that the punitive damages award was grossly
excessive and violated due process by significantly exceeding
the presumptive single-digit ratio set out in State Farm.111
In its decision, the Court addressed the first issue but not
the second issue.112 The Court held that due process prohibited
a jury from imposing damages based on harm to nonparties.113
It also held, however, that the jury could consider harm to nonparties in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct.114 The Court reasoned that to allow the jury to punish
the defendant for harm to “strangers to the litigation” would
prevent the defendant from mounting a proper defense.115 The
defendant would have insufficient facts as to the number of
such nonparty victims, as well as the circumstances and seriousness of their injuries.116 The Court found that the jury instructions did not sufficiently narrow the jury’s consideration of
harm to nonparties, resulting in a risk that the jury’s punitive
damages award may punish the defendant not only for the rep107. Id. at 1060–61.
108. Id.
109. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006), vacated
sub nom. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). The Court’s
opinion appears to contain a mathematical error in adding economic and noneconomic damages. The error has been corrected in the text of this Article.
110. Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
111. Id. at 1061–62.
112. Id. at 1062.
113. Id. at 1063.
114. Id. at 1063–64.
115. Id. at 1063.
116. Id.
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rehensibility of its conduct, but also for similar harm the defendant may have caused to smokers not parties to the case.117
The Court then remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme
Court to allow that court to apply the standard set out in the
opinion.118 Though it set out extensive standards regarding the
permissible role of nonparty harm, the Court expressly refused
to reach the issue of whether the punitive damages award was
“grossly excessive” based on the ratio to compensatory damages.119
Like in its prior decisions, the Court in Williams was clearly concerned about excessive damages awards, particularly
those awarded in nationwide mass torts where numerous suits
can result in multiple, and potentially overlapping, punitive
damages awards. The Williams Court, however, implicitly assumed that “strangers to the litigation” can bring their own
lawsuits to recover not only punitive damages, but also damages compensating economic and noneconomic harm such as pain
and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and the like. Indeed,
like the plaintiff in State Farm, the plaintiff in Williams recovered far more in noneconomic damages ($800,000) than she did
in economic damages ($21,485.80).120
But what about cases where the noneconomic harm remains uncompensated? The Court’s ratio analysis specifically
allows for departing from single-digit ratios where economic
harm is small or the injury is hard to detect or difficult to value.121 Thus, in cases where the plaintiff can establish the existence of actual or potential harm that is not included in compensatory damages, the reviewing court should ensure that
such harm is part of the ratio assessment.
The next Part shows how since BMW, and particularly
since State Farm, lower courts have fairly easily applied the
presumptive single-digit ratio exception in cases involving
small or nominal damages. Lower courts have more often failed
to do so, however, where damages are more substantial but still
fail to value all the actual or potential harm.

117. Id. at 1063–65.
118. Id. at 1065.
119. Id.
120. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006), vacated
sub nom. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
121. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582–83 (1996).
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III. RECOGNIZING AND VALUING HARM
A. THE INTENTIONAL TORT CASES POST-BMW
This Section evaluates several intentional tort cases involving claims for trespass, defamation, and civil rights violations. These cases are notable for several reasons. First, compensatory damages were small or nominal and punitive
damages far exceeded single-digit ratios. Second, the reviewing
courts had to determine whether to apply a strict ratio or
whether to use the language in BMW and State Farm to justify
a higher ratio.122 Third, the reviewing courts had little difficulty upholding punitive damages awards whose ratios to the
compensatory damages awards far exceeded single digits. Finally, in each case, the court justified its decision by appealing
to the punitive and deterrent purposes of punitive damages, as
well as the fact that compensatory damages in the case were
nominal or very small. As a result, no punishment and deterrence of egregious conduct would result without departing from
a single-digit ratio.
None of these cases are difficult. These are not the cases
that motivated the Supreme Court to develop constitutional
limits on punitive damages in the first place. In most cases, the
plaintiff recovers little or no compensatory damages. Thus, punitive damages in these cases ultimately represent some
amount of harm not valued as compensatory damages. Though
courts do not explicitly state their reasoning, these cases show
that courts continue to use punitive damages to serve compensatory, as well as punitive and deterrent, goals where the tort
system fails to recognize certain types of harm.
1. Intentional Trespass Cases
In 2002, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the
constitutional ratio issue under BMW in an intentional trespass suit.123 The court conducted a constitutional due process
review of punitive damages in a case where the jury awarded
the plaintiff $819 in rental value for the disputed land and

122. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425; BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (allowing
higher ratios when the conduct is egregious and the economic injury is small,
hard to detect, or difficult to value).
123. Brantner Farms, Inc. v. Garner, No. C6-01-1572, 2002 WL 1163559, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 2002).
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$50,000 in punitive damages.124 The jury found that the defendant deliberately disregarded the plaintiff ’s rights when the defendant maintained that he owned the property and threatened
to have the plaintiff arrested and have his farming equipment
confiscated if he used the property.125 The defendant argued
that because the ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages was 61-to-1, the punitive damages award was
unconstitutionally excessive under BMW.126 The court of appeals disagreed and held that such arguments fail if there is a
small compensatory award.127 The court reasoned that applying
a strict-ratio requirement to a small compensatory damages
award would “negate the purpose of deterring the defendant
from engaging in the same reprehensible conduct in the future.”128
Other jurisdictions similarly have focused on the small
amount of compensatory damages and the reprehensibility of
the conduct in affirming punitive damages awards that far exceed single-digit ratios. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reinstated a $5000 punitive damages award based on an
award of nominal damages for the defendant’s intimidating and
abusive behavior in blocking access to a road.129 To justify its
decision, the court relied on the exception established in BMW,
which permits higher ratios where an egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of damage or when noneconomic
harm is difficult to determine.130 The court also pointed to decisions in other jurisdictions allowing ratios of 150-to-1 and higher where damages were small and the defendant in the case
had acted with malice or oppression.131
The Jacque case discussed in the introduction to this Article also follows this rationale. In Jacque, the Wisconsin Su124. Id. at *6.
125. Id. at *1.
126. Id. at *6.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Roberie v. VonBokern, No. 2004-SC-00250-DG, 2006 WL 2454647, at
*3 (Ky. Aug. 24, 2006).
130. Id. at *7 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583
(1996)).
131. Id. at *8 (citing Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1016 (5th
Cir. 2003) (upholding a punitive damages award of $15,000 based on nominal
damages of $100); Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 164 (2d Cir.
2001) (upholding a $10,000 punitive damages award where there was no compensable injury and only nominal damages of $1)).
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preme Court upheld a punitive damages award of $100,000
based on a $1 nominal damages award for the corporate defendant’s trespass across the plaintiff ’s property after the plaintiff
had denied access.132 In finding the award consistent with due
process, the court emphasized that a private landowner’s right
to exclude is “‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”133 The
court asserted that, beyond protecting the interests of the individual landowner, society also has an interest in preventing
landowners from resorting to self-help remedies, which requires assuring landowners as a group that the legal system
will appropriately punish wrongdoers.134 Based on the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct in this case, the court concluded that BMW did not require a mathematical bright-line
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages and that
adhering to the ratio “would turn the concept of punitive damages on its head.”135 These cases provide examples of how
courts properly recognize the important role of punitive damages in providing redress for invasions of personal rights that are
not tied directly to a compensatory damages award.136
2. Defamation and Civil Rights Cases
Cases involving claims for defamation137 or violations of
civil rights resemble the trespass cases in that courts have al132. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997).
133. Id. at 159–60 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384
(1994)).
134. Id. at 160–61.
135. Id. at 164–65; see Gianoli v. Pfleiderer, 563 N.W.2d 562, 570 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1997) (upholding a punitive damages award of $200,000 based on a compensatory damages award of $12,000 in a land-based tort case on the grounds
that conduct toward neighbors was outrageous and that the case was “not a
situation in which a runaway jury awarded mind-boggling punitive damages
that require a reining in by a judge”).
136. See Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1093, 1098 (2005) (stating that punitive damages can be justified as a “means
of protecting the plaintiff ’s individual tort right from wrongful infringements
by the defendant”); Sebok, supra note 45, at 1036 (advising that punitive damages “fit within a scheme of civil recourse and provide a unique form of redress
where citizens have suffered the indignity of a willful violation of their private
rights”).
137. Defamation is a communication that tends “to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 559 (1977). Because of First Amendment concerns, plaintiffs who are
public officials or public figures must establish that the defendant “published
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lowed punitive damages to be based upon nominal damages if
the defendant acted with sufficient malice, deliberate disregard, or other intent sufficient to justify an award of punitive
damages.138 Judicial analysis of punitive damages in these cases often focuses on the need to effectively punish and deter the
defendants’ egregious conduct that was directed specifically at
the plaintiff.139 Thus, these opinions imply that punitive damages serve as redress where the judicial system does not compensate for the harm associated with the violation of the personal right.
Significantly, there is no reason courts could not attempt to
value the violation of the right and award compensatory damages for such noneconomic harm. Courts have valued other
nonpecuniary injuries such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.140 Indeed, a move in this direction would avoid
reliance on the Supreme Court’s exception to single-digit ratios,
and may increase certainty and precision in damages
awards.141 For now, though, courts facing situations involving
noneconomic harm continue to use punitive damages which exceed single-digit ratios—rather than increased compensatory
damages—to pursue deterrent, punitive, and even compensatory goals. Whatever the court’s approach, the Supreme Court
has given lower courts the flexibility to award higher punitive
damages in cases if awarding that same amount as compensatory damages would be a stretch under current law.142

a knowing or reckless falsehood” to recover presumed or actual damages for
defamation. 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, at 1121, 1192. Where the issue involves a
matter of public concern, private-figure plaintiffs must establish negligence or
some other fault plus actual damages and, if warranted, punitive damages. Id.
Where the alleged defamation is of no public concern, private-figure plaintiffs
can recover presumed damages and punitive damages, if appropriate. Id.
138. See Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843, 874–75 (N.D. Iowa
2004) (“[M]any civil rights violations will fall into this category of cases in
which it is difficult to assess a monetary value to the harm suffered, thus resulting in only the imposition of nominal damages, but where punitive damages are warranted.”); 2 DOBBS, supra note 42, at 1192.
139. See Sherman, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 874–75.
140. See supra text accompanying note 97 (discussing judicial recognition
of pain and suffering damages).
141. But see infra notes 325–26 and accompanying text (discussing the lack
of precision in jury instructions for awards of pain and suffering and other
nonpecuniary damages).
142. See Sebok, supra note 45, at 1036 (proposing a theory of punitive
damages that “provide[s] a unique form of redress where citizens have suffered the indignity of a willful violation of their private rights”).
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For instance, in 2005, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit upheld a punitive damages award of
$600,000 against officers in a civil rights unlawful arrest case,
despite a compensatory damages award of only $279.05.143 Casino security officers placed a seventy-two-year-old casino patron in a security office, told her that she had committed a
crime, handcuffed her, photocopied her identification, reported
her to the state police, refused to let her use the bathroom
alone, and forced her to wait outside in the heat for her afternoon bus home.144 The security officers subjected the plaintiff to
this treatment because they suspected her of stealing one nickel from a slot machine.145
In its analysis of the constitutionality of the punitive damages award, the court emphasized that the case was not about a
monetary injury, but about a violation of the elderly plaintiff ’s
right not to be unreasonably seized and detained in an outrageous manner.146 Relying on BMW and prior civil rights cases,
the court found that “where ‘injuries are without a ready monetary value,’ such as invasions of constitutional rights unaccompanied by physical injury or other compensable harm,” higher
ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages should be
expected.147
Likewise, in a 2006 defamation case from the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas, although the
court reduced the punitive damages award from $150,000 to
$50,000, the 20-to-1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages remained in excess of the single-digit ratio.148 The
court recognized that “the monetary value of harm to reputation is difficult to determine” and that the plaintiff ’s intangible
harm to reputation “transcends out-of-pocket loss.”149 Although
the court reduced the award, the driving force behind the reduction was the rationale that a more modest amount would be
143. Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 635, 649–50 (6th
Cir. 2005) (upholding a punitive damages award but reducing it from
$875,000).
144. Id. at 632–34.
145. Id. at 632.
146. Id. at 645.
147. Id. at 645–46 (quoting Argentine v. United Steel Workers of Am.,
AFL-CIO, 287 F.3d 476, 488 (6th Cir. 2002) (sustaining a 42.5-to-1 ratio and a
$400,000 punitive damages award in a union retaliation case)).
148. Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v. Sundance Sauna, Inc., No. 04-2597-KHV,
2006 WL 3021109, at *5–7 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 2006).
149. Id. at *6.
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sufficient to achieve punishment and deterrence—not the ratio
guidepost.150
These cases show that courts routinely invoke BMW in departing from single-digit ratios where the act is egregious, but
the actual damages are small. One reason is that concerns of
the jackpot justice system of multimillion dollar awards and
their hindering effect on commerce—concerns which prompted
a reining in of punitive damage verdicts—are simply not
present in these cases. These cases involve discrete parties
where the total damages, both compensatory and punitive, do
not approach even $1 million. Thus, courts more easily allow
disproportionate punitive damages awards.
More important, courts in these cases recognize, at least
implicitly, that the punitive damages awards should reflect the
injury to the plaintiff, and serve to punish and deter the defendant.151 Such a goal is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition that where such harm is not recoverable as compensatory damages, there is a greater role for punitive damages.152
Although the Court has made clear that punitive damages’
compensatory component has no place in cases where significant nonpecuniary damages are awarded,153 lower courts have
justified disproportionate punitive damages awards to reflect
the value of the individual’s interest in the integrity of his or
her rights.154 These courts appeared to assume that there were
no (or very little) compensatory damages in cases associated
with violation of those rights, so it was appropriate to rely on
150. Id. at *6–7.
151. See Nemecek v. Santee, No. 05-0518, 2006 WL 334298, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 15, 2006) (stating that “harm” does not equate with “damages” and
concluding that the harm “clearly exceeded the amount of compensatory damages awarded him”); Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 429
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (focusing on punishment and deterrence but also discussing the need for punitive damages to ensure society’s reinforcement of
personal accountability); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154,
160 (Wis. 1997) (noting that the law infers some damage for direct entry on
the land of another, whether or not compensatory damages are awarded, as
nominal damages represent recognition that although “immeasurable in mere
dollars, actual harm has occurred”) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 13,
at 67–84).
152. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
437–48, n.11 (2001) (noting that the types of compensatory damages available
to plaintiffs, including pain and suffering, broadened in the twentieth century,
rendering it unnecessary for punitive damages to contain a compensatory
component to account for a plaintiff ’s inability to recover for those injuries).
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 123–50 and accompanying text.
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punitive damages to punish and deter interference with those
rights as well as value that uncompensated harm.
The courts’ practice of using punitive damages for multiple
purposes where the plaintiff cannot easily value the harm in
monetary terms should be extended beyond the “easy” cases described above to cases involving environmental harm or other
cases involving difficult valuation issues. The next Section
presents several examples of environmental harm cases and
argues that, in contrast to the intentional torts cases, lower
courts in environmental harm cases have not fully embraced
the Court’s suggestion that where harm is difficult to value
economically a higher ratio is constitutional.
B. THE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM CASES
The environmental harm cases discussed below have much
in common with the intentional tort cases analyzed in the previous Section. First, both types of cases involve defendants who
acted with malice, deliberate indifference, extreme recklessness, or another mental state required under state law to impose punitive damages. Second, both types of cases involve private party or local government plaintiffs attempting to recover,
not only for harm to their own economic interests, but also for
harm to broader interests. In cases involving environmental
damage, the defendant has caused harm to the environment
(air, water, soil, etc.) for which the plaintiff cannot (and sometimes should not) be compensated because of standing limitations or valuation difficulties. As a result, compensatory damages awards, though often large in these cases, undervalue the
harm, and courts risk undermining punishment and deterrence
if they insist on applying the single-digit ratio presumption.
There are two types of environmental cases in this Section.
First, I discuss cases in which courts fail to include harm to the
environment as part of compensatory damages, apply a singledigit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, and reduce the
jury’s punitive damages award. In these cases, courts do not
recognize that some or all of the environmental harm was not
valued, and also fail to utilize the Supreme Court’s exception to
single-digit ratios to award a more appropriate damage
amount. Second, I discuss cases in which the courts more fully
recognize environmental harm. Both types of cases are instructive in showing the difficulty in valuing environmental harm
and the impact that difficulty has on the amount of punitive
damages the court awards.
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1. Undervaluing Environmental Harm
The Alabama Supreme Court faced the issue of undervalued environmental harm in a 2000 case where landowners sued
a nearby hog feedlot under theories of nuisance, negligence,
and trespass for damage to their property and for environmental harm.155 One defendant, Tyson Foods, had contracted with
the landowner-defendant to maintain a hog farm for the benefit
of Tyson.156 Shortly after the hog farm went into operation, it
began emitting noxious odors and discharging waste into a
stream and onto the plaintiffs’ property.157 The plaintiffs presented evidence at trial that, although both defendants knew
about the ongoing air and water pollution, they did not make
the necessary repairs.158
At trial, the only damages the plaintiffs recovered were for
diminution in value to their property based upon the “smells
coming from [the defendant’s] property, as well as upon the
waste that flowed onto the [plaintiffs’] property.”159 The trial
court specifically charged the jury that the compensatory damages, if any, would be “the difference in the reasonable market
value of the property of the plaintiffs with the nuisance, and
the value of what the property would have been had the nuisance not existed.”160 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2500 in
compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.161
In conducting its constitutional review of the punitive
damages award, the state supreme court discussed all of the
BMW factors. With respect to reprehensibility, the court found
that both defendants were aware of the continuing pollution,
knew how to fix it, and were financially able to do so.162 The
court concluded that the conduct was “fairly reprehensible” but
not “highly reprehensible.”163 Next, in applying the ratio presumption, the court found that a ratio of 30-to-1 was unreasonable under Alabama law and BMW.164 The court reasoned that,
although the plaintiffs had “endured the odors that emanated
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Stevens, 783 So. 2d 804, 805–07 (Ala. 2000).
Id. at 806.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 809.
Id.
Id. at 810.
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from the farm, as well as the frequent overflow across their
land, the jury awarded only $2500 in compensatory damages”
and the defendants later stopped raising hogs.165 Based on its
conclusion that a 30-to-1 ratio was unreasonable, the court reduced the punitive damages award to $25,000.166 The court did
not explain how it arrived at $25,000, but did discuss the state
law factors that justified the reduction.167 The court focused on
the fact that the likelihood of additional harm to the plaintiffs
was “nonexistent,” that the harm was reprehensible but not “so
reprehensible,” the lack of criminal sanctions imposed, the implicit assumption that the punitive award was a sufficient incentive for potential plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial, and
the fact that “the jury did not find the actual harm suffered by
the [plaintiffs] significant enough to require a large compensatory-damages award.”168
However, not all justices agreed with the remittitur of
damages. One justice thought “the defendants’ environmental
pollution so egregious that the entire punitive award is justified.”169 Another justice, by contrast, argued that the punitive
damages should be reduced not to $25,000, but to $20,000.170
His reasoning stemmed from his proposal in an earlier case to
adopt a stricter mathematical presumption for evaluating any
punitive damages award under Alabama law and BMW. Under
his approach, punitive damages in all cases would be the greater of $20,000 or three times the compensatory damages award;
applying that theory to this particular case resulted in a
$20,000 punitive damages award.171
The justices’ varying conclusions reflect their different
views of both the nature of the harm the defendant caused and
how the punitive damages award should relate to that harm.
The majority and one other justice measured the harm by the
compensatory damages awarded at trial, which consisted solely
of the economic diminution in value to the plaintiffs’ proper165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 810–11.
168. Id. (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223 (Ala. 1989)).
The court noted that other people living near the hog farm incurred “the same
kind of injury the Stevenses suffered.” Id.
169. Id. at 811–12 (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
170. Id. at 811 (Houston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. See id. (citing Prudential Ballard Realty Co. v. Weatherly, 792 So. 2d
1045, 1052–54 (Ala. 2000) (Houston, J., concurring)).
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ty.172 However, the compensatory award did not represent any
part of the environmental damage to the stream, resulting in
the conclusion that punitive damages were excessive.173 Because the court assessed the reasonableness of punitive damages awards by calculating the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages, the artificially low compensatory figure caused the
court to characterize as excessive a punitive damages award
which may not have been based on the total harm.174 Yet
another justice, by contrast, saw this as a case of “environmental pollution” and one so “egregious” that the punitive damages
the jury awarded were not unreasonable.175 Similarly, the jury,
though careful to follow instructions and award compensatory
damages only for economic harm, attempted to account for the
defendant’s reprehensible conduct in polluting the environment
through its punitive damages award.176 The Alabama Supreme
Court, however, reduced the award to correspond more directly
with the compensatory damages in the case (creating a 10-to-1
ratio),177 and in doing so erased the noneconomic harm that
was “difficult to determine.”178
An Iowa federal district court in 1998 similarly frustrated
a jury’s attempt to award punitive damages based in part on
unmeasured environmental harm.179 In E.T. Holdings, Inc. v.
Amoco Oil Co., the plaintiff, a shopping center owner, sued
Amoco Oil Company for nuisance and trespass in connection
with petroleum that had leaked from the defendant’s nearby
gas station and migrated to the plaintiff ’s property, which re-

172. Id. at 810–12.
173. Id. at 810–11.
174. See id. at 809–10.
175. Id. at 811–12 (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In Ballard Realty, Justice Houston established his formula of a $20,000
award or three times the compensatory damages award. Ballard Realty Co.,
792 So. 2d at 1052 (Houston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Johnstone also concurred, stating that he agreed with Justice Houston’s benchmark approach but that it may require reevaluation in “peculiar”
cases. Id. at 1056 (Johnstone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Apparently, Justice Johnstone found the facts surrounding the environmental
pollution in the Tyson case sufficiently “peculiar” to warrant departing significantly from Justice Houston’s benchmark approach. Id.
176. See Tyson Foods, 783 So. 2d at 811.
177. Id.
178. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
179. E.T. Holdings, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., No. C95-1034 MJM, 1998 WL
34113907, at *14–16 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 27, 1998).

KLASS_6FMT

2007]

12/13/2007 9:36 AM

VALUING HARM

115

sulted in soil and groundwater contamination.180 At trial, the
plaintiff established that Amoco knew that the tanks at its station were leaking and that the petroleum was migrating offsite
for several years before it reported the contamination to the
state or anyone else.181 Despite continuous urging by its environmental employees, Amoco continued to store gasoline in the
tanks, neglected to perform an assessment, and, even after it
reported the contamination, refused to install the appropriate
remediation system to avoid the spread of contamination.182
Amoco did not wish to put more money into an unprofitable
station.183 It was not until more than five and one-half years after the company discovered the contamination that it finally
closed the station and removed the tanks.184
At trial, the plaintiff sought compensatory damages and
punitive damages. The jury awarded compensatory damages of
$1.7 million, which was the plaintiff expert’s estimate of the
decrease in fair market value attributable to the contamination.185 The jury also awarded the plaintiff $15 million in punitive damages based on Amoco’s conduct.186 Following the jury’s
verdict, the district court conducted a constitutional due
process review of the punitive damages award under BMW.187
The court acknowledged that punitive damages were appropriate based on Amoco’s reckless operation of the station for several years after it had knowledge that the tanks were leaking,
contrary to the advice of its own employees and consultants.188
The court also focused on the fact that Amoco operates hundreds of gas stations in the United States, conducts operations
throughout the world, and, in 1997, had revenues of $17.667
billion and earnings of $168 million.189 The court noted that the
benzene levels under the shopping mall were severely elevated
and that Amoco’s conduct had caused significant contamination.190
180. Id. at *1.
181. Id. at *3–9.
182. Id.
183. Id. at *12, *15.
184. Id. at *9.
185. Id. at *10, *16.
186. Id. at *14.
187. Id. at *14–16.
188. See id. at *16 (“[T]he Court finds that the punitive damages verdict
was not the product of passion or prejudice.”).
189. Id.
190. Id. at *15.
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Despite these findings, the court ordered a remittitur of the
punitive damages award to $2 million, reasoning that: (1) the
jury accepted the plaintiff ’s expert’s estimate as to the loss of
value to the shopping center and thus the plaintiff was “fully
compensated” for its claimed damages; (2) Amoco had eventually spent considerable time and money to clean up the problem;
and (3) the reduced amount of punitive damages represented
slightly more than 1% of Amoco’s earnings and thus was adequate punishment.191 This case, like the Alabama case, shows
that the court’s perception that the plaintiff has been compensated “in full” drives the court to apply the ratio factor to reduce punitive damages. However, the court’s reduction of punitive damages resulted from a failure to value the harm the
defendant caused to natural resources. Because the plaintiff
did not own the land surrounding its shopping center, it could
not seek compensation for the significant contamination to surrounding groundwater and soil. The court’s refusal to acknowledge this significant damage and its reliance on the plaintiff ’s
“full compensation” resulted in an unjustified reduction of punitive damages.192
The same phenomenon occurred to a lesser extent in a
2006 California case. The city of Modesto, California sued Vulcan Materials Company, Dow Chemical Company, and several
other defendants for marketing perchloroethylene (PCE) to dry
cleaners.193 Substantial evidence demonstrated that, as of the
late 1970s, defendants Vulcan and Dow knew PCE was hazardous and a potential human carcinogen, and also knew it had
contaminated and would further contaminate public drinkingwater supplies.194
After a four-month trial, the jury awarded $3,173,834 in
compensatory damages along with $100 million in punitive
damages against Vulcan and $75 million against Dow.195 The
city’s compensatory damages consisted solely of its “economic
damages,” consisting of the city’s environmental investigation
costs and wellhead filtration costs.196 The court’s opinion con191. Id.
192. See id.
193. City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Dow Chem. Co., Nos. 999345,
999643, 2006 WL 2346275, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2006).
194. Id. at *7.
195. Id. at *1. The jury also awarded punitive damages of $75,000 against
a third defendant, R.R. Street & Co. Id.
196. Id. at *1, *8.
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tained no discussion of the broader effects of the contamination
to the aquifer, the permanence of the impairment, or any other
valuation of public harm. In reviewing the jury’s punitive damages award, the court relied on both California law197 and the
Supreme Court’s constitutional guideposts,198 and concluded
that California due process “mirrors” federal due process.199
In applying the state and federal due process standards,
the court agreed that substantial evidence supported the jury’s
finding that the conduct of Vulcan and Dow was “despicable
and was done with a willful and knowing disregard of the
rights or safety of another.”200 The court, however, relied heavily on the ratio guidepost in holding that the award exceeded
state and federal due process limits.201 Noting that few awards
exceeding single-digit ratios will satisfy due process, the court
also concluded the exception to this presumption did not apply
because damages were not small, hard to detect, or hard to
measure.202 The court then stated that ratios of 3- or 4-to-1 “express the due process norm” and should apply to the case.203
The court rejected the city’s argument that it should measure the reasonableness of punitive damages in relation to the
$40 million required to remediate the groundwater instead of
the $3 million compensatory award.204 The court reasoned that
the $40 million cost to remove PCE from the city wells was an
“unrealistic” estimate.205 Based on a $3 million measure of
harm, a 4-to-1 ratio, and an allocation of the punitive damages
between the two defendants based on various factors, the court
held that a $7,254,115 punitive damages award against Vulcan
and a $5,441,221 punitive damages award against Dow was
“the maximum constitutional award [allowable] under both
197. Under California law, the court reviewed: “(1) the reprehensibility of
defendant’s conduct, (2) the requirement of a reasonable relationship between
the amount of punitive damages and the harm to the plaintiff, . . . (3) in view
of the defendant’s financial condition, the amount that is necessary to punish
the defendant and discourage future wrongful conduct,” and (4) “the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Id. at *6 (citing Simon v. San Paolo
U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 70 (Cal. 2005)).
198. Id. at *5 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at *7 (listing instructions given to the jury).
201. Id. at *10–13, *16–17.
202. Id. at *10–11.
203. Id. at *11.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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federal and state due process.”206 The reduced award against
Vulcan represented one-third of one percent of its net worth
and the reduced award against Dow amounted to less than
four-hundredths of one percent of its net worth.207
While the punitive damages awarded were a significant
sum, in setting a 4-to-1 ratio, the court refused to value any environmental harm other than that attributable to the immediate cost to the city in providing water to its residents. Even if
the $40 million cleanup price tag was unrealistic, the court
completely ignored the long-term harm to the resource itself
when it calculated the “harm” against which to measure punitive damages.
This is not to say courts should never reduce a jury’s punitive damages award in environmental harm cases.208 Courts
always have exercised review over punitive damages and
should continue to do so. The analysis here, though, cautions
that, in conducting a ratio review under state law or federal
due process, courts should ensure they account for harm caused
by the defendant that is difficult to measure as compensatory
damages. Below, I discuss several cases in which courts do consider harm to public resources in analyzing the ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages. In some cases, this consideration enters into the court’s decision because either a private
or government party has quantified the harm for the court. In
other cases, the harm was not quantified, but received sufficient attention to allow the court to either depart from a singledigit ratio based on BMW and State Farm or allow punitive
damages at the outer limit of the ratio guidepost.
2. Recognizing Environmental Harm
In Johansen,209 discussed in the introduction of this Article, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a
punitive damages award that was one hundred times the compensatory damages award did not violate federal due process
limits.210 In that case, the plaintiff-landowners sued the defendant mining company for allowing acidic water to escape from
the mining site and pollute streams that flowed onto the plain206. Id. at *14–15.
207. Id. at *15.
208. See SCHLUETER, supra note 31, § 6.4(B), at 379–83 (discussing judicial
review of the adequacy and excessiveness of punitive damages awards).
209. Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1999).
210. Id. at 1339.
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tiffs’ properties.211 The final award consisted of $47,000 in compensatory damages and $4.35 million in punitive damages.212
In reviewing the $4.35 million punitive damages award, the
court of appeals found that, because the defendant had ultimately cooperated in attempting to address the environmental
harm, the defendant’s conduct was not severely reprehensible.213
The court, however, focused on other factors to justify a
punitive damages award that was one hundred times the compensatory damages. Relying on BMW ’s instruction that higher
ratios are allowed where the injury is hard to detect or “the
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult
to determine,”214 the court found that “[t]his is such a case” justifying departure.215 The court recognized that the actual damages awarded were small, but that “the state’s interest in deterring the conduct—environmental pollution—is strong.”216 As
a result, “ratios higher than might otherwise be acceptable are
justified.”217 The court also relied on Supreme Court authority
which suggested that the wealth of the defendant may be considered in order to promote the deterrence function of punitive
damages.218 The defendant in this case was an “extremely
wealthy international corporation” and the court suggested the
award should attract the attention of the company’s environmental decision-makers and other managers.219
Although Johansen was decided prior to the more stringent
ratio requirements announced in State Farm, the court recognized that a punitive to compensatory damages ratio of 100-to1 was large enough to “raise a suspicious eyebrow,”220 and
noted that there is no “mathematical bright line” for a constitu-

211. Id. at 1326.
212. Id. at 1326–27. The jury originally awarded $45 million in punitive
damages which the lower court reduced first to $15 million based on state law,
and later to $4.35 million based on the BMW guideposts. See id.
213. Id. at 1336.
214. Id. at 1338 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582
(1996)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462
n.28 (1993)).
219. Id. at 1338–39.
220. Id. at 1338 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tionally acceptable ratio.221 Thus, to defend its punitive damages award, the court emphasized the fact that the compensatory
damages in the case did not reflect the harm to the important
state interest in preventing environmental pollution.222 In this
way, the court considered the full scope of the harm the defendant caused in evaluating the constitutionality of the award.
While Johansen is instructive because it conducted a full
review of harm, the Louisiana Court of Appeals’s decision in
Grefer v. Alpha Technical223 in 2005 is also instructive, despite
the fact that the Supreme Court recently vacated and remanded the decision for further consideration in light of Phillip
Morris USA v. Williams.224 The lower court’s decision contains
a helpful analysis because it recognized that, where most or all
of the environmental harm is reflected in the compensatory
award, single-digit ratios can be appropriate. In Grefer, the
plaintiff-landowners sued Exxon Mobil Corporation and other
defendants for contaminating their property with radioactive
materials in the process of obtaining oil from the plaintiffs’
property.225 Even though Exxon knew that the property had become contaminated with radioactivity, it did not disclose this to
the plaintiffs or anyone else.226 Several years later, testing on
the property revealed the contamination and the plaintiffs sued
for compensatory and punitive damages.227
After a five-week trial, a jury awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages of $56,145,000, of which $56 million was
the cost of restoring the property to its original condition.228
221. Id. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 576) (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Id.; see Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l. Carbon, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-994MEF, 2006 WL 173653, at *7–8 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2006) (affirming a punitive
damages award nearly ten times that of the compensatory damages award for
wrongful emissions of carbon black onto plaintiffs’ properties and stating that
the case would have supported a much larger punitive damages award because of the reprehensibility of the conduct, injury to the environment, and
need to deter the defendant and others from a “pollute and pay” environmental policy) (citing Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1339
(11th Cir. 1999)), aff ’d, 481 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed,
76 USLW 3082 (U.S. Aug 24, 2007) (No. 07-257).
223. 901 So. 2d 1117 (La. Ct. App. 2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007).
224. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. at 1371.
225. Grefer, 901 So. 2d at 1124–28.
226. Id. at 1127.
227. Id. at 1127–28. The plaintiffs’ claims were for negligence, strict liability, nuisance, and fraud. Id.
228. Id. at 1128.
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The jury also awarded $1 billion in punitive damages.229 In reviewing the compensatory damages award, the court first rejected Exxon’s argument that it was completely unreasonable
to award $56 million in restoration costs for a property worth
only $1.5 million.230 The court responded that disputes between
private litigants over remediation costs also involve consideration of state environmental standards and interests because of
the state’s role as the public trustee for environmental protection.231 Thus, the court held that it was appropriate for the jury
to award restoration costs, and that the jury was not restricted
to considering only the minimum legal cleanup standards.232
The court then conducted a federal due process review of
the punitive damages. It focused, in large part, on the fact that
the compensatory damages in the case were substantial and far
exceeded the property’s value of $1.5 million.233 The court concluded that, under these circumstances, a 2-to-1 ratio was the
highest that could comport with due process.234 Accordingly,
the court ordered a remittitur of the punitive damages award
from $1 billion to $112,290,000.235
A review of this case shows that significantly lowering a
punitive damages award in an environmental harm case can
fulfill the purposes of punitive damages when the compensatory damages award attempts to more fully value the actual and
potential harm to the environment. In considering the state’s
interest in protecting public resources, the court allowed compensatory damages to include a significant portion of the environmental harm. Because the compensatory damages award
was so substantial, a lower ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages was appropriate.236
Finally, no treatment of punitive damages and environmental harm would be complete without a discussion of the Ex-

229. Id.
230. Id. at 1136.
231. Id. at 1137–38.
232. Id. at 1141–42.
233. Id. at 1150.
234. Id. at 1151.
235. Id. at 1152.
236. The court allowed the defendant’s wealth to be a consideration but not
the basis for affirming the $1 billion punitive damages award. See id. at 1151.
The evidence at trial included the fact that Exxon was the largest corporation
in the world with assets of $251 billion, year 2000 revenues of $228.439 billion, and a year 2000 total net worth of $174 billion. Id. at 1150–51.
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xon Valdez case.237 On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon
Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound,
Alaska.238 The Exxon Corporation owned the tanker and employed Captain Joseph Hazelwood to command it on that
day.239 Exxon knew both that Hazelwood was a relapsed alcoholic and that he had been drinking leading up to the day in
question.240 As a result of a combination of several events and
conditions, including Hazelwood’s absence from the deck due to
his inebriated state, the Exxon Valdez ran aground, resulting in
the dispersal of an estimated eleven million gallons of crude oil
into Prince William Sound.241 This release and the resulting
environmental harm completely disrupted the largest commercial and subsistence fishing operation in the nation, wreaked
havoc on the community at large, and caused devastating damage to the environment and ecosystem.242 It was arguably the
largest environmental disaster in the nation’s history.
The early phases of the resulting litigation and negotiation
included payment of over $1 billion to local, state, tribal, and
federal governments for environmental damages, and a jury
award to a plaintiff class of commercial fishermen of over $500
million in compensatory damages.243 In a later phase of the trial, the jury awarded the fisherman plaintiff class $5 billion in
punitive damages.244 The now eighteen-year litigation has
spanned the Supreme Court’s decisions in BMW, State Farm,
and the series of cases in between.245 The various appeals and
remands focus, not surprisingly, on the constitutional due

237. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th
Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219),
cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276).
238. Id. at 1076.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1076–77.
241. Id. at 1077.
242. Id. at 1078.
243. Id. at 1078–80.
244. Id. at 1082.
245. In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(“The resolution of punitive damages has been delayed because the course of
this litigation has paralleled the course followed by the Supreme Court when,
in 1991, it embarked on a series of decisions outlining the relationship of punitive damages to the principles of due process embodied in our Constitution.”),
amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224
(U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29,
2007) (No. 07-276).
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process limit on the punitive damages award in this case. On
the first remand, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska applied the then-new BMW standard and reduced the punitive damages award to $4 billion.246
In its most recent decision, the district court applied the
State Farm standard and increased the allowable award to $4.5
billion.247 The court’s analysis is extremely detailed and its discussion of the ratio element is instructive. First, the court recognized that the key issue was ensuring that the ratio analysis
sufficiently considered the harm and potential harm caused by
Exxon’s conduct.248 The court stated that it was “not restricted
to the jury’s compensatory award in evaluating the ratio guidepost” because the Supreme Court had indicated clearly that potential harm must be considered, and that potential harm was
“often not subject to precise calculation.”249
With regard to actual harm, the court rejected Exxon’s argument that the compensatory damages figure, for purposes of
applying the ratio test, could consist only of the compensatory
damages actually awarded against Exxon ($20.3 million).250 Instead, the court found that the actual harm was $513,147,740,
which included all amounts Exxon paid in connection with the
spill to the plaintiffs, municipalities and villages, native corporations, and others directly affected by the spill.251
In addition to these amounts, “there was purely noneconomic harm that cannot be quantified; there was harm
which likely occurred but has not yet been valued; and there
was potential harm—all flowing from the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.”252 On the issue of potential harm, the court found
there was no way of calculating how much additional harm
would have resulted if the entire cargo of oil had spilled.253
Thus, relying on BMW, the court determined that “the appropriate approach is to accommodate the unknowns by allowing a
246. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. Even though it reduced the award, it did so only upon the express direction of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and stated that it still believed the original $5 billion punitive damages award was appropriate and constitutional. Id.
247. Id. at 1110.
248. Id. at 1098.
249. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460
(1993)).
250. Id. at 1099–1103.
251. Id. at 1101.
252. Id. at 1103.
253. Id.
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higher ratio to pass constitutional muster.”254 Unlike in State
Farm, where a portion of the award was for emotional distress
and already contained a punitive element, the compensatory
damages award in this case encompassed solely economic
loss.255 Moreover, Exxon’s financial status justified a higher
award in order to fulfill the appropriate punishment and deterrence objectives. Exxon’s treasurer had testified that “full payment of the judgment would not have a material impact on the
corporation or its credit quality,”256 suggesting to the court “at
least some evidence of the absence of over-deterrence.”257
Based on its analysis, the court concluded that the original
punitive damages award of $5 billion satisfied due process.258
Because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had ordered
the district court to lower the award, however, it entered judgment on punitive damages in the amount of $4.5 billion, a 9.74to-1 ratio.259
The Ninth Circuit, however, again disapproved of the punitive damages award, holding that due process limitations required a punitive damages award that was not more than five
times the economic harm caused by the defendant, or $2.5 billion.260 The court emphasized, consistent with the district
court’s analysis, that the punitive damages award could be
based only on actual and potential economic harm to the plaintiffs and not on harm to public natural resources.261 It stated
that “[w]e are precluded, as the jury was, from punishing Exxon for befouling the beautiful region where the oil was spilled,
because that punishment has already been imposed in separate
litigation.”262
The court then had two main issues to resolve: First, how
to value the harm against which to compare the punitive damages award. Second, whether that award exceeded due process
254. Id. at 1104 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582
(1996)).
255. See id.
256. Id. at 1105.
257. Id. at 1105–06.
258. Id. at 1110.
259. Id. at 1106, 1110.
260. In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602, 625 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W.
3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S.
Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276).
261. Id. at 601.
262. Id.
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limits. On the issue of how to calculate the harm, the court
agreed with the district court that, in addition to economic
losses, the spill caused other “undeniable, if not easily quantifiable, harms,”263 and affirmed the district court’s conclusion as
to that harm figure.264 The court then found, however, that a
nearly 10-to-1 ratio violated due process requirements because
the reprehensibility of the conduct, while “in the higher realm
of reprehensibility,” was not “in the highest realm” and thus
any ratio exceeding 5-to-1 was unconstitutional.265
Here, both the district court and the court of appeals held
decisively that the harm to the plaintiff was not limited to the
compensatory damages award. Instead, the courts used all
available figures to value economic losses and then concluded
that even those figures did not adequately reflect the potential
harm and harm that could not be or had not been translated into monetary value.266 Thus, the court ensured that the ratio
analysis encompassed total harm as completely as possible and
did not limit the harm to solely the compensatory damages
awarded at trial.
The Exxon Valdez case is unique because of its scope. The
disaster was massive, the harm was massive, Exxon’s wealth is
massive, and the amount of valuation information available on
economic loss and environmental harm is massive. The case is
sui generis in many ways. Regardless of the unique nature of
the case, it serves as a model of how courts can conduct a due
process ratio evaluation carefully to ensure that there is a recognition (even if not a full valuation) of total harm. As shown in
the cases above, simply comparing punitive damages and com263. Id. at 618–19.
264. Id. at 619–23. Exxon argued that the measure of harm was only $20.3
million because the court should subtract $493 million representing amounts
paid to plaintiffs through Exxon’s voluntary claims program and other settlements. Id. at 619. The only difference between the district court’s harm value
and the court of appeals’ harm value was a $9 million overpayment that the
court of appeals found the district court had overlooked and should not have
been included in the final number. See id. at 623.
265. Id. at 618, 624.
266. See In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1103 (D. Alaska
2004), vacated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d
1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No.
07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276). The
court did not include in its ratio analysis payments by Exxon to state and federal governments for natural resource damage that amounted to $900 million
over ten years. Id. at 1078–79, 1099–1101; see In re The Exxon Valdez, 472
F.3d at 601.
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pensatory damages is insufficient and is not supported by either BMW or State Farm. Instead, courts in environmental
harm cases must consider all harm caused by the defendant,
whether or not the plaintiff can actually recover such harm as
compensatory damages. The next Section discusses existing
roadblocks to assessing total harm in environmental cases and
provides suggestions for surmounting them.
C. EXPLORING STANDING AND VALUATION DIFFICULTIES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM CASES
In the environmental harm cases, courts are able to place a
monetary value either on the costs the plaintiff has spent to
remediate the property or the diminution to the market value
of the property as a result of the contamination.267 The court
may also attempt to value harm to public natural resources
when there is a plaintiff in the case with the right to recover for
damage to natural resources. Very often though, standing doctrines and the difficulty of placing monetary values on natural
resources prevent such valuation.
Such standing and valuation restrictions limit significantly
the ability to remedy environmental harm and to properly punish and deter environmental wrongdoing. Despite the vast array of federal and state statutes imposing severe civil and criminal penalties for polluting activities and violation of
environmental standards,268 there is often less than optimal enforcement of such laws at both the federal and state levels.269
267. See Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1138–39 (La. Ct. App.
1995), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007);
Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., No. CIV. A. CV 191-178, 1997 WL
423108, at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 9, 1997), vacated in part, 170 F.3d 1320 (11th
Cir. 1999).
268. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 28, at 948–49 (discussing the range of
civil and criminal penalties for violating federal environmental standards, including fines of up to $50,000 and three years in prison for knowing violations,
and fines of up to $250,000 and fifteen years in prison for violations that knowingly endanger another).
269. See TONY DUTZIK, COPIRG FOUND., THE STATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT 22–26 (2002) (on file with author) (citing the lack of budget,
staff, effective enforcement policies, political will, and accountability as reasons why state governments have failed to effectively enforce environmental
protection laws); Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resources Damages:
Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 851,
873–76 (1989) (discussing enforcement problems as the result of limited funding and “institutional forces endemic to the way any large organization makes
decisions”); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 115 (2005) (“It is a common view that during the past
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Scholars, government officials, and others blame the underenforcement on the lack of effective enforcement policies, accountability, and political will; agency capture; and insufficient
agency budgets and staff.270 While scholars disagree over
whether these failures arise from public choice problems or
other systemic deficiencies at the state or federal level,271 underenforcement remains.272 In this situation, private actions
brought to address environmental harm, such as common law
suits and statutory citizen suits, can play a significant role in
filling the enforcement gap. Congress, in trying to fulfill its
long-standing goal of enhancing citizen enforcement of environmental laws,273 has created citizen-suit provisions in most
major federal environmental statutes in recognition of the fact
that federal agencies will lack necessary resources (and some-

five years the environmental zeal of the federal executive branch has waned,
resulting in fewer new or strengthened laws, fewer strengthened regulations,
and less federal enforcement than one would have expected in a more proenvironment administration.”).
270. See DUTZIK, supra note 269, at 22–26; PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1027–28 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing Congress’s use of citizen-suit provisions to address breakdowns in federal enforcement of environmental laws because of a lack of resources and political pressure from the
executive branch); Buzbee, supra note 269, at 121 (stating that growthoriented tax and labor policies, along with the impact of interest group pressures, often lead state and local governments to underenforce existing laws
and regulations).
271. Compare DUTZIK, supra note 269, at 22–26 (asserting that state enforcement of environmental laws fails because of a lack of budget, staff, effective enforcement policies, political will, and accountability), and Buzbee, supra
note 269, at 121 (arguing that underenforcement of environmental statutes
and regulations arises, in part, from inherent inertial forces and interest
group pressures), with Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571–78 (2001)
(rejecting the claim that federal environmental regulations arise out of the
clash between environmental and business interests, and listing several alternative public choice accounts of environmental regulation).
272. Revesz, supra note 271, at 559 (addressing the causes of “underregulation” of state environmental statutes); see Buzbee, supra note 269, at 121 (noting the “temptation to fail to implement and enforce laws and regulations”).
273. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979)
(“Congress intended citizen suits to both goad the responsible agencies to more
vigorous enforcement of the anti-pollution standards and, if the agencies remained inert, to provide an alternate enforcement mechanism.”); Gardeski v.
Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating
that the legislative history of the Clean Air Act suggests a “sensitive handling
of citizen suits, that reflects Congress’s conviction that such suits can perform
an indispensable function”).
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times will lack the political will) to address all statutory violations.274
However, as discussed below,275 statutory citizen-suit provisions have significant limitations, particularly in valuing and
recovering damages for harm to natural resources. Common
law public nuisance claims similarly suffer from standing limitations that limit citizen efforts to seek redress for environmental harm.276 These limitations suggest that a better approach, either in the form of legislative action, judicial action,
or both, is needed to obtain appropriate punitive damages for
environmental wrongdoing in cases where standing or valuation limitations restrict recovery.
1. Standing Limitations for Valuing Harm
Many of the environmental harm cases involve claims of
public or private nuisance. A public nuisance is an “unreasonable” interference with a right common to the general public.277
In many public nuisance cases, the plaintiff is a state or local
government with presumptive standing to recover for harm to
the public right.278 When the plaintiff is a private party, however, standing limitations apply.279 In order to recover damages
in a private action for public nuisance, the plaintiff must have
suffered a “special injury,” which the Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines as “harm of a kind different from that suffered by

274. Conservation Law Found. v. Browner, 840 F. Supp. 171, 174–76 (D.
Mass. 1993) (stating that the congressional purpose of the Clean Air Act’s citizen-suit provision was to authorize citizens to act as private attorneys general
because the Act’s sponsors were wary of federal environmental agencies’ lack
of will and resources); PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, at 1027–28, 1033 (stating that, beginning in 1970, Congress included citizen-suit provisions in virtually all the major environmental laws because it viewed such suits as an “efficient policy instrument” and a “participatory mechanism” at a time when
limited resources or lack of political will made enforcement of environmental
regulations difficult).
275. See infra notes 292–301 and accompanying text.
276. See infra notes 279–88 and accompanying text.
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979); id. § 821B(2) (listing
the criteria for deciding if an interference is unreasonable).
278. See id. § 821C(2)(b) (stating that a public official or agency may
represent the state or political subdivision in public nuisance actions).
279. See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the
Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 757–60 (2001) (explaining problems with the public nuisance doctrine that presently limit plaintiff standing to seek recovery for community-based social and environmental
problems).
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other members of the public.”280 In interpreting the special injury requirement, courts have generally required that the
plaintiff suffer an economically recognizable injury, such as injury to person, profits, or land.281
The requirement of a recognizable injury creates difficulty
in environmental harm cases because damage to natural resources, which does not result in a direct economic loss, does
not constitute a recognizable injury for standing purposes. This
difficulty is illustrated by another lawsuit flowing from the Exxon Valdez spill, where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a class of Alaskan Natives could not bring a public nuisance action to recover for harm to their subsistence way
of life.282 Their way of life was described as “dependent upon
the preservation of uncontaminated natural resources, marine
life and wildlife” reflecting “a personal, economic psychological,
social, cultural, communal and religious form of daily living.”283
In affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the action, the court
of appeals agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs’
noneconomic subsistence claims were not “different in kind”
from those suffered by other members of the public, although
they “potentially might be different in degree.”284 The court
noted that the plaintiffs received compensation for their economic loss claims associated with the spill in an earlier settlement, and that the law could not value the remaining claims of
noneconomic injury.285
As a result of the court’s conclusions, the plaintiffs’ remedy
could be no more than the benefit they, along with other
Alaskans, received from the substantial payments Exxon made
to local, state, and federal governments for environmental restoration.286 In this case, because federal, state, and local gov280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (1979).
281. See MADDEN & BOSTON, supra note 28, at 66–78 (listing cases in
which plaintiffs who suffered personal injury, or whose privately-owned land
or chattels were harmed, met the special injury requirement).
282. In re The Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 1997).
283. Id. at 1197.
284. Id. at 1198.
285. Id. at 1197–98; see In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994
WL 182856, at *3 (D. Alaska Mar. 23, 1994) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims because they sought a recovery of nonmarket claims of cultural damage which
was “not founded” on any legal theory recognized by maritime law), aff ’d, 104
F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).
286. In re The Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d at 1198 (noting that any claims arising out of damage to the Natives’ subsistence way of life “miss the mark” because the right to a subsistence way of life is “shared by all Alaskans”).

KLASS_6FMT

130

12/13/2007 9:36 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:83

ernments had already recovered $1 billion in connection with
environmental harm, the plaintiffs were not acting to fill a
“gap” in enforcement of environmental protection laws.287 In
many cases, however, significant environmental harm occurs,
and no state or federal plaintiff is willing or able to seek recovery, leaving private tort actions as the only practical means of
attempting to value and recover for damages to natural resources.288 As a result, the decision has a potentially significant
and adverse impact on other private party actions where the
plaintiff has not suffered a direct pecuniary loss.
The standing limitations that hinder full use by environmental plaintiffs’ of public nuisance claims apply equally to
private nuisance claims, but for different reasons. A private
nuisance is a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in
the private use and enjoyment of land.”289 Because the plaintiff
seeks recovery for interference with land the plaintiff owns rather than a public right, the problem is less one of standing
than of remedy. A defendant is liable for private nuisance if his
or her conduct causes the invasion, and the invasion is (1) intentional and unreasonable; or (2) unintentional and negligent,
reckless, or subject to strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities or conditions.290 Because the interest the plaintiff
seeks to protect is the violation of the plaintiff ’s use and enjoyment of land, the remedy generally consists of the damages
measured by the diminution in value or restoration costs.291
287. See supra notes 268–74 and accompanying text (discussing the role
private lawsuits play in filling federal and state enforcement gaps).
288. See Kirstin H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism
in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 167, 180–81 (2006) (discussing the
federal government’s failure to address “environmental issues posing interstate externalities” and its current “deregulatory and passive approach toward
environmental regulation”); Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
699, 749 n.280 (2006) (citing authorities that discuss the failure of the federal
government to enforce existing environmental regulations and its decision not
to enact new regulations to address growing environmental problems). For an
analysis of the problem of underenforcement of federal and state environmental statutes, see supra notes 268–72 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the difficulties states have in valuing damages to natural resources, see infra Part III.C.2.
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
290. Id. § 822.
291. See id. § 929(1)(a); see also Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117,
1139–42 (La. Ct. App. 1995), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer,
127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007). The Grefer decision discussed earlier remains unusual,
however, in that the plaintiff recovered restoration costs without first incur-
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Thus, private nuisance claims do not provide a vehicle for
plaintiffs to recover for damage to natural resources that cannot be translated into an economic loss borne by the plaintiff.
Beyond the common law claims just discussed, even federal
statutes enacted for environmental protection purposes have
significant standing limitations. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) all
contain provisions under which federal and state governments
and Indian tribes can recover for damage to natural resources.292 For instance, CERCLA imposes liability for the release of a hazardous substance that causes “damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,”293 including the
reasonable cost of assessing such loss or injury.294 The OPA
contains a similar provision in the case of oil discharges, and
specifically describes the measure of damage for natural resources as the sum of (1) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating,
replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the damaged natural
resources; (2) the diminution in value of those natural resources pending restoration; and (3) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.295 Private parties and local governments, however, cannot recover for natural resource damages
under any of these laws. Instead, the statutes limit their recov-

ring those costs or obtaining government approval for a remediation plan, and
because the restoration costs significantly exceeded the value of the property.
See id. at 1141 (allowing recovery of $56 million in restoration costs even
though market value of the property was $1.5 million and the court could not
force the plaintiff to use the money for a cleanup). For a discussion of cases
that measure harm to land from past invasions, see MADDEN & BOSTON, supra
note 28, at 255–70.
292. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f )(4) (2000) (listing a provision of the Clean Water
Act allowing for the recovery of costs of removal for oil or hazardous substance
from navigable waters and other related areas, including any costs or expenses incurred “in the restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed”); 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(C),
9607(f ) (2000) (containing CERCLA provisions allowing recovery for natural
resource damages caused by the release of a hazardous substance).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000). CERCLA defines “natural resources”
as “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States[,] . . . any State or
local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16).
294. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
295. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d).
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ery to the costs incurred in investigating and remediating the
harm caused by the release of hazardous substances.296
Moreover, although state and federal governments recovered $1 billion in compensation for natural resource damages in
the Exxon Valdez oil spill,297 claims for natural resource damages remain far less frequent than claims to recover cleanup
costs.298 Indeed, many argue that existing provisions allowing
recovery for damage to natural resources are significantly underutilized.299 This is due, in large part, to the difficulty of valuing such damages and the failure of federal agencies to prom-

296. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
297. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (D. Alaska
2004) (discussing the settlement between Exxon, the United States, and the
State of Alaska for damages to natural resources), vacated per curiam, 472
F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76
U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276).
298. James P. Power, Reinvigorating Natural Resource Damage Actions
Through the Public Trust Doctrine, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 418, 448 (1995) (concluding that the CERCLA natural resource damage provision has “enormous
potential” for recovery of damages, but that the actual experience has been
disappointing with only fifty suits brought since 1980 and only two suits that
have gone to trial); see AMY W. ANDO ET AL., ILL. WASTE MGMT. & RESEARCH
CTR., NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: METHODS AND CASES 2
(2004), available at http://www.wmrc.uiuc.edu/main_sections/info_services/
library_docs/RR/RR108.pdf (discussing the various statutes that allow recovery of natural resource damage, but detailing the difficulty states face in
bringing actions upon such statutes and developing valuation techniques to
conduct damage assessments). But see N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 A.2d 345, 354 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding as a matter of first impression that the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control
Act’s definition of “cleanup and removal costs” gives the state the right to recover for the “loss of use” of natural resources injured or destroyed by an illegal discharge, in addition to the costs of physical restoration).
299. Breen, supra note 269, at 867–68 (stating that the experience with
natural resource damage claims as of 1989 “is largely one of missed opportunities” with relatively few federal or state claims filed); Gordon Johnson, Deputy
Bureau Chief, Envtl. Prot. Bureau, Office of N.Y. Attorney Gen., Address at
the Columbia Law School Symposium: The Role of State Attorneys General in
National Environmental Policy (Sept. 20, 2004), in 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
461, 462–63 (2003) (expressing concern that damages associated with smaller
spills, while frequent, often are not pursued by states because of the time and
money required to bring such lawsuits). But see Gerald F. George, Litigation of
Claims for Natural Resource Damages, SE98 ALI-ABA 397, 399 & n.2 (2000)
(Westlaw) (stating that claims for natural resource damage under CERCLA
have become “commonplace” with sixty-seven claims resolved by the federal
government as of 1996 for payments totaling over $135 million, but noting
that few claims have gone to trial, resulting in little case law).
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ulgate regulations to help in the valuation process.300 In
tion, the statutory prohibition on local government suits for
natural resource damages precludes recovery by those governmental entities closest to the problem.301
The various limitations on standing and available remedies
mean that, in a private party tort action to recover for environmental harm, the compensatory damages rarely will value
fully the harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct. This lack
of full valuation is a major gap in the punitive damages framework because many cases involving significant environmental
harm do not have the benefit of a government plaintiff with
standing to sue for the full scope of damages to environmental
resources. Thus, it is important that plaintiffs be able to utilize
private lawsuits as a means of advancing valuation techniques.302 Such private lawsuits are consistent with the federal
environmental law framework. Most of the major federal environmental statutes have explicit savings clauses, showing Congress’s intent to allow private citizens to continue to utilize the
common law to seek relief for environmental harm.303

300. See ANDO ET AL., supra note 298, at 2; PLATER ET AL., supra note 270,
at 942–44 (discussing disagreements between government agencies and
stakeholders on how to value natural resource damages and the general uncertainty in this area of the law); Dale Thompson, Valuing the Environment:
Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource Damages, 32 ENVTL. L. 57, 58–61
(2002) (detailing difficulties in valuing natural resource damages).
301. See Michael J. Wittke, Comment, Municipal Recovery of Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 921, 941–43
(1996) (arguing that local governments should be given standing to sue for
natural resource damages under CERCLA and that “[i]t is the extraordinary
case, such as the Exxon Valdez disaster, that warrants widespread notice and
action” leading to federal and state government involvement).
302. See Antolini, supra note 279, at 757–60 (discussing the interest of
scholars and practitioners in reinvigorating private party actions and common
law remedies to address the lack of federal enforcement of environmental
laws); Breen, supra note 269, at 874–76 (stating that the government apparatus for bringing enforcement actions is cumbersome and subject to significant
budget restrictions and arguing that citizen suits for natural resource damages would result in substantial gains in both environmental compliance and recovery of natural resource damages); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and
Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 579–80
(2007) (discussing the lack of federal enforcement of environmental law and
the need for an increased role by state governments, local governments, and
private parties in environmental protection efforts).
303. See Klass, supra note 302, at 570 & n.143 (citing savings clauses in
federal environmental statutes and numerous cases interpreting savings
clauses to allow for common law claims to enjoin environmental harm and obtain damages for such harm).
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2. Valuation Limitations
Beyond standing problems, valuation problems also impede
a full assessment of environmental harm. Valuation difficulties
exist even in cases where a federal or state government plaintiff can recover for natural resource damages under statutory
or common law theories. While claims for direct property losses
and diminution in market value can be quantified fairly easily,
natural resources have values that are not yet fully captured in
the market system.304 What is the value of a seal? Of a bird? Of
a day at the beach? Of the ability to prevent another Exxon
Valdez disaster in the future?305
Scholars have created “use values,” which assign an attributed market value to things not traded in the marketplace in
an attempt to capture their value.306 “Consumptive value”
attributes a value to lost-resource uses by sportsmen or tourists
who, but for the harm to the resource, would have taken wildlife in hunting or fishing pursuits.307 “Nonconsumptive use” refers to the ecosystem’s value to photographers, bird watchers,
and others who gain appreciation from nature.308 These nonconsumptive uses include an “existence value”—the amount a
person is willing to pay to know that the resource is there, even
if they do not yet actively use or enjoy it.309 Such uses also in304. Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462–64 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (“From the bald eagle to the blue whale and snail darter, natural resources have values that are not fully captured by the market system. . . . Option and existence values may represent ‘passive’ use, but they nonetheless
reflect utility derived by humans from a resource, and thus, prima facie, ought
to be included in a damage assessment.”) (citations omitted); PLATER ET AL.,
supra note 270, at 183–94 (discussing the difficulty of valuing natural resources).
305. See Lisa Heinzerling, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.,
Address at the Columbia Law School Symposium: The Role of State Attorneys
General in National Environmental Policy (Sept. 20, 2004), in 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 449, 454–56 (2005) (discussing efforts to value the loss of natural
resources, including the use of contingent valuation surveys); Thompson, supra note 300, at 58–61(discussing the difficulties of valuing nonmarket commodities such as natural resources and problems with the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) of calculating “nonuse values” in natural resource
damages cases).
306. PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, at 188.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 476 n.73 (explaining existence value); James
Peck, Measuring Justice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigating Natural Resources Damages, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 279–81 (1999) (discussing methods of valuation, including a biocentric approach (as opposed to
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clude an “option value,” which measures how much a person
would to pay to reserve the option to use that resource in the
future.310
Scholars have developed economic methods for estimating
some of these values. Each of the various methods creates a
hypothetical human market for resources.311 For example, the
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) sets up “hypothetical
markets to elicit an individual’s economic valuation of a natural
resource.”312 CVM employs interviews and surveys with individuals to arrive at a “willing to pay” value for resources.313 As
early as 1989, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit approved the use of CVM for ascertaining use and option values of
resources in state and federal natural resource damages actions.314
A second method that attempts to quantify the value of environmental resources is the growing field of “ecosystem services.”315 Ecosystems are a key component of our natural capital,
but historically society has not assigned them a monetary value
because they are “free.”316 A growing body of literature presents
the case for valuing and thus increasing protection for natural
resources such as wetlands, diverse plant and animal species,
healthy forests, and clean air.317 This framework attempts to
an anthropocentric approach) which recognizes the intrinsic value of natural
resources independent of human satisfactions).
310. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 475 n.72.
311. PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, at 188.
312. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 475 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
313. Id.
314. See id. at 476–79 (sustaining Department of the Interior regulations
relying on CVM for calculating option and use values).
315. Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in
NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 1, 3
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (defining ecosystem services as “the conditions
and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make
them up, sustain and fulfill human life”). Ecosystem services support “ecosystem goods” such a seafood, forage, timber, biomass fuels, natural fiber, and
pharmaceutical and industrial products. Id.
316. See Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosystem Service Districts, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 341 (2001).
317. See James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes
from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 871–77 (2005) (discussing developments
in research on ecosystem services and reviewing initiatives around the world
which have sought to create markets for natural capital); James Salzman &
J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53
STAN. L. REV. 607, 609–16 (2000) (analyzing environmental trading markets
(ETMs) such as wetland banking programs, air pollution trading programs,
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provide a mechanism to capture the value of ecosystem services
as well as quantify and promote service values.318
CVM and ecosystem services, however, have yet to make
their way into common legal parlance, and natural resource
damage continues to be less-than-fully valued in many lawsuits.319 As a result, even the most obvious vehicle for recovering harm to natural resources—CERCLA’s natural resource
damage provision—arguably remains a “sleeping giant.”320 Significant confusion persists regarding the appropriate measure
of damages in environmental harm claims and neither state
nor federal governments have made frequent efforts to recover
for such harm, even though they regularly seek out-of-pocket
remediation costs.321 Indeed, the Exxon Valdez case, where Exxon agreed to pay state and federal governments approximately
$1 billion for “environmental damage,” remains an anomaly.322
As scholars have recognized, “[t]he subtle relationship between
environmental systems and the uses provided by the systems
. . . is not readily grasped by the relative crudeness of the legal
system.”323 This results in an inability to easily convert damages to, and loss of use of public environmental assets into, a
monetary damages award. The controversy surrounding CVM,
reflected in scholarly writing supporting and criticizing CVM,
shows that it remains a challenge to value natural resources in
the context of civil litigation.324
and species habitat programs, and suggesting that modifications to such programs would better capture the value of nonfungible resources). See generally
NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra
note 315 (containing a collection of articles on economic and ecological issues
surrounding ecosystem services).
318. See Lawrence H. Goulder & Donald Kennedy, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods, in NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 315, at 23, 33–35
(discussing methods for valuing nonuse and nonconsumptive values from ecosystems).
319. See supra Part III.B.1.
320. PLATER ET AL., supra note 270, at 942.
321. See id. at 942–45 (discussing CERCLA remedies).
322. See In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (D. Alaska
2004), vacated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d
1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No.
07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276).
323. Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology
in Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction,
89 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1995).
324. Compare id. at 1030–31 & n.8, 1032–34 (criticizing the use of CVM in
natural resource damage assessments and citing to recent economic litera-
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In many ways, the difficulty of valuing environmental
harm is similar to the difficulty of valuing other forms of noneconomic harm. As one court has stated, damages for nonpecuniary injury such as pain and suffering, loss of life, and loss of
enjoyment of life is based on a “legal fiction” that the courts accept, “knowing that although money will neither ease the pain
nor restore the victim’s abilities, this device is as close as the
law can come in its effort to right the wrong.”325 For decades
now, the legal system has allowed juries to award damages for
pain and suffering, loss of life, and other nonpecuniary injury
despite the valuation difficulties.326 Thus, as a practical matter,
significant changes in legal doctrine are not required to allow
recovery for natural resource damages and loss of ecosystem
services, at least in cases where standing hurdles are not at issue.327 Indeed, there is much less of a “legal fiction” involved in
awarding damages for natural resource harm than for pain and
suffering because natural resource damages can be tied directly
to remediating the harm. What is required is a greater willingness by current government plaintiffs and private plaintiffs
with sufficient standing to seek such damages, and for courts to
be open to awarding such damages with greater frequency.
In sum, these standing and valuation limitations highlight
the difficulty of recognizing and awarding damages for environmental harm, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a private
party or a government entity, or whether the claim is one under
common law or statute. Under these circumstances, harm to
the environment regularly goes unvalued or undervalued, and
ture), with Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 269, 285–92 (1989) (discussing the nonuse values of natural resources),
Dobbins, supra note 97, at 944–46 (arguing that CVM should be utilized to
quantify natural resource nonuse values and comparing the valuation process
to that for nonpecuniary losses such as pain and suffering), and Judith Robinson, Note, The Role of Nonuse Values in Natural Resource Damages: Past,
Present, and Future, 75 TEX. L. REV. 189, 213 (1996) (concluding that CVM
“provides the best available method for quantifying nonuse values; despite the
intangible nature of the injuries”).
325. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989).
326. See Geistfeld, supra note 136, at 1106 (“The absence of well-defined
standards for determining pain and suffering damages is well known.”); see
also Jennifer H. Arlen, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for
Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1985) (“[C]urrent wrongful
death damage rules, which base recovery . . . on the future income of the victim, are not efficient[, but] it is not possible to design efficient damages rules
to govern recovery for loss of life.”); supra note 97 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 266–71 (2007).
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wrongdoers go unpunished or underpunished, similar to the
problem of the undervaluation of harm that exists in the intentional tort cases discussed in Section III.A. The next Section
further explores the problems of undervaluation of environmental harm by comparing environmental harm cases to the
intentional tort cases, and addresses the methods courts have
used in the intentional torts cases to address valuation difficulties.
D. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE INTENTIONAL TORT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM CASES
This Section more closely compares the intentional tort
cases and environmental harm cases to explore why courts
have often taken such different approaches to the two types of
cases. While there are significant differences between the intentional tort and environmental harm cases for purposes of
punitive damages, there are important similarities as well.
First, the differences. There is no question that the absolute
dollar amounts of both compensatory damages and punitive
damages are far smaller in the intentional tort cases.328 State
Farm and BMW both state clearly that when an egregious act
has resulted in a small amount of economic damage, a higher
ratio of punitive damages may be appropriate.329
As discussed above, courts have no difficulty recognizing
these cases as ones in which significantly larger punitive damages awards are necessary to punish the defendant for misconduct and deter the defendant and others from engaging in similar misconduct in the future.330 Recognizing that the singledigit ratio has little role in these cases, courts defer to the jury’s
assessment of the punitive damages award necessary to fulfill
the purposes of punitive damages based on applicable state law
factors.331 Furthermore, lower courts realize that the purpose of
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area is to reign in
multimillion dollar and billion dollar punitive damages
awards.332 Civil rights, defamation, and trespass cases do not
fit that model, giving lower courts more discretion to “do justice” and use punitive damages to serve as a form of redress
328. See supra Part III.A.
329. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
330. See supra Part III.A.
331. See supra Part III.A.
332. See supra Part III.A.
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within substantive due process limitations.
Unlike the small awards in intentional tort cases, the environmental harm cases often involve significant compensatory
damages and punitive damages awards.333 In addition, the
awards in these cases attract attention, as they appear at first
glance to be precisely those the Court attempted to “rein in”
with the introduction of its single-digit ratio presumption.334
However, as the Exxon Valdez case illustrates, the presence of
a large, multinational corporate defendant tempers the massiveness of an award for several reasons. First, a more substantial punitive damages award is required to punish and deter
the conduct of a large company, which possesses more financial
resources than an individual or a small corporate defendant. In
reviewing the punitive damages awarded by the jury, the Exxon Valdez court found that “[w]hat is sufficient to effect just
but not excessive deterrence of Captain Hazelwood, and what is
sufficient to effect just and not excessive deterrence of the Exxon defendants are vastly different.”335
Although the Supreme Court warned in State Farm that
“[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award,”336 the Court has never
rejected the use of wealth as a factor, and has confirmed the
appropriateness of its use in prior cases.337 Numerous state
courts direct juries to consider wealth as a factor in setting a
punitive damages award,338 which is consistent with the ap-

333. See supra Part III.A.
334. See infra notes 385–86 and accompanying text (discussing some scholars’ use of the term “environmental torts” to refer to toxic tort cases with significant nonpecuniary damages and their arguments that such cases are in
particular need of punitive damage reform); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the types of cases driving the Supreme Court’s constitutional restrictions
on punitive damages).
335. In re The Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1065 (D. Alaska. 2002),
amended by 296 F.Supp.2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated per curiam, 472
F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76
U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276).
336. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003).
337. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462
n.28 (1993) (stating that it is “well-settled law” that the net worth of the defendant can be considered in setting punitive damages); see also supra note 42
(discussing the validity of using the defendant’s wealth in assessing punitive
damages).
338. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (discussing factors state
courts direct juries to use when setting punitive damages).
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proach in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.339 Thus, simply because the amount of punitive damages awarded in environmental harm cases is larger than those in many of the intentional
tort cases does not mean courts should mechanically reduce
jury awards in such cases.
Second, and more importantly, large companies have the
potential to cause damage on a far greater scale. These are
companies in a position to spill fifty-three million gallons of oil
into one of the most treasured natural environments in the nation.340 These are companies whose scope of operations make
them capable of contaminating land with high levels of radioactive material.341 These are companies whose operations create
the potential for serious contamination of public drinking-water
supplies.342 In short, such cases involve companies who, as a
result of their size and power, have the ability to cause harm on
a scope not possible for many other defendants. For example,
while the BMW owners experienced distress upon discovering
their cars were repainted without their knowledge, that distress simply did not compare to the mental distress suffered by
those people who had “to change the way they make their living” as a result of the Exxon spill.343 Thus, while the awards in
the environmental harm cases are large enough to raise eyebrows, the corporate defendants’ wealth and the scope of harm
they caused in these cases render the awards just as appropriate as the smaller amounts awarded against smaller and less

339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (stating that the trier
of fact may consider the means of the defendant).
340. The Exxon Valdez was carrying 53 million gallons of oil when it ran
aground on Bligh Reef. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077–
78 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006),
amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W.
3073 (U.S. Aug. 20, 2007) (No. 07-219), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W.
3082 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2007) (No. 07-276). Experts estimated that 11 million gallons were discharged in the grounding of the ship, but had Captain Hazelwood
succeeded in his efforts to back the ship off Bligh Reef, significantly more
oil―perhaps the entire cargo―would have spilled. Id.
341. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1123–26 (La. Ct. App.
2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007);
see supra note 225 and accompanying text.
342. City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Dow Chem. Co., Nos. 999345,
999643, 2006 WL 2346275, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2006); supra notes
193–94 and accompanying text.
343. In re The Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76
U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276).
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wealthy defendants in the intentional trespass and defamation
cases.
Despite the difference in the size of awards, in both types
of cases the harm the defendant caused does not fully translate
into compensatory damages. In many of the intentional tort
cases, no compensatory damages are available. This inability to
recover results from the failure of the civil justice system to
provide monetary relief for an individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property or person.344 The failure of compensatory damages to account for all of the harm the defendant
causes is easy to see in intentional torts cases, when damages
are often nominal. However, in the environmental harm cases,
where damages often total millions of dollars, this gap is not so
easy to see. Courts are able to place a monetary value on the
harm as either costs the plaintiff has incurred in restoring
property or as diminution in the fair market value of the property as a result of contamination. Courts sometimes attempt to
value harm to natural resources when a plaintiff who has the
right to recover damages for such harm is present in the case.
More often, though, standing doctrines and the difficulty of assigning a monetary value to natural resources prevents valuing
the harm the defendant has caused to natural resources.
In sum, both the intentional tort and environmental harm
cases involve harm for which the judicial system has difficulty
setting an economic value, resulting in no, or only partial, valuation of the harm caused by the defendant. Because the damage amounts are so great in environmental harm cases, courts
struggle to identify the significant harm that remains unvalued. By contrast, courts in intentional tort cases easily recognize the undervaluation and can award punitive damages to
correct the undervaluation without due process limitations.
Part IV offers a framework to address the problem of valuation
for punitive damages purposes in both types of cases.

344. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 306 (1965) (requiring a plaintiff to suffer illness or other “bodily harm” to recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress); id. § 46 (requiring a plaintiff to suffer “bodily harm” in
connection with emotional distress to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a defendant); JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS
PROCESS 667–76 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the development of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also supra notes 139–54 (discussing courts’ use of punitive damages as a substitute for the inability to compensate for invasions of person or property).
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IV. VALUING HARM AND APPLYING RATIOS
This Part introduces the beginning of a framework for
awarding punitive damages that helps courts more fully recognize total harm and concludes with some suggestions for potential legislative and judicial initiatives that may help alleviate
concerns that a full valuation of harm will result in “windfall”
punitive damages to plaintiffs in environmental harm cases.
First, intentional tort cases and environmental harm cases
require different frameworks. Even though an undervaluation
of harm exists in both types of cases, in the intentional tort
cases the unvalued harm is still personal to the plaintiff—it is
the plaintiff’s right to exclude or to personal integrity that has
been violated. As a result, it seems appropriate to award any
increase in punitive damages to the plaintiff. The punitive
damages substitute for the compensation of the personal right
violation that goes unvalued in the case, just as punitive damages awards substituted for unrecoverable emotional harm in
earlier cases.345 There is little concern regarding plaintiff
“windfalls” in these cases. The total awards are modest, and
punishment and deterrence objectives suggest that in these often interpersonal disputes where no third-party interests or
public resources are involved, the plaintiff herself should receive the award.346
The same is not true in the environmental harm cases. If
the court values harm to natural resources beyond the plaintiff’s direct economic loss, it is not so clear that the court
should award the plaintiff the increased punitive damages
representing the full valuation of harm. If the punitive damages are based on harm to resources “owned” by the public instead of the plaintiff, the public should receive the portion of
the punitive damages award reflecting the harm to public resources, minus some amount awarded to the plaintiff as an incentive for bringing the suit. These proposals are discussed below.

345. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 437 n.11 (2001).
346. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 136, at 1097–98 (2005) (stating that the
punitive damages in cases involving the violation of a plaintiff ’s individual
rights punish the wrong to the plaintiff rather than to society, resulting in no
overlap with any related criminal penalties and thus not raising an issue of
“double punishment”).
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A. AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN INTENTIONAL TORT CASES
WITH SMALL OR NOMINAL DAMAGES
Intentional tort cases, such as defamation, trespass, and
civil rights violations, are cases where all or a large portion of
the harm goes unvalued as compensatory damages and the
harm is focused on the individual plaintiff. As shown above,
courts are able to conduct a full due process analysis without
adhering to single-digit ratios. Although courts often reduce the
amount of punitive damages, these reductions are invariably
based not on any ratio requirement, but instead on the reprehensibility of conduct, the financial status of the defendant, the
purposes of punitive damages, and other state statutory factors.347 Importantly, the courts recognize that a consideration
of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is not helpful
in the analysis because compensatory damages do not
represent the harm the defendant caused. Though courts do not
attempt to place a dollar amount on the harm that goes unvalued, their recognition of its existence justifies disregarding the
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. As a result,
courts implicitly allow punitive damages to serve a compensatory role, in addition to fulfilling punitive and deterrent purposes. In these cases, it seems perfectly appropriate that the
plaintiff be the beneficiary of the punitive damages award.
Based on the unique characteristics of intentional tort cases, the best approach appears to be as follows. First, courts
should continue to recognize, as they generally do, that the single-digit ratio should not apply to small or nominal damages in
intentional tort cases. Courts also should recognize, though,
that it is not that there is no actual harm in these cases, but
only that the civil justice system does not value the harm resulting from an invasion of personal or property rights. Courts
need not attempt to actually measure that harm, although
there is nothing that prevents them from attempting to do
so.348 Instead, they should recognize expressly that such harm
exists and, after applying BMW and State Farm, affirm those
awards that exceed a single-digit ratio. In sum, courts should
continue to use the approach laid out by many courts already,

347. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing factors for punitive damages).
348. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text (discussing and critiquing existing and historical standards for recovery of damages).
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with the addition of an explicit recognition of the nature of the
plaintiff ’s unvalued harm.
B. AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ENVIRONMENTAL HARM
CASES
As discussed above, environmental harm cases require a
framework different than intentional tort cases. First, one possible approach would be to relax standing requirements to allow
private parties to bring public nuisance and statutory claims.
These actions could result in quantifying environmental harm
using restoration costs and the natural resource valuation
techniques discussed earlier,349 even if the plaintiff would not
be responsible financially for the restoration. Under this approach, single-digit ratios of punitive damages to compensatory
damages would be appropriate because compensatory damages
would include the total value of harm.
Another possible approach would be to abandon the singledigit ratio presumption and follow the analysis courts have
used in intentional tort cases. Under such an approach, courts
would recognize harm occurred but remains unvalued as damages, and would use the flexible standards in BMW and State
Farm to depart from single-digit ratios when harm is difficult
to value.350 This approach involves far less precision than the
first. However, it may be more realistic to implement, at least
in the short term, as it does not require major changes to existing standing doctrines. This approach must address directly the
Court’s recent decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, which
limits the plaintiff ’s ability to rely on harm to nonparties (here,
harm to public natural resources) in seeking punitive damages.351 As shown below, this concern is significantly lessened by
the place-based nature of environmental harm. This is in contrast to products liability claims, toxic tort claims to recover for
personal injury, and other types of claims based on nationwide
conduct.
Finally, under both the approaches to valuing harm in environmental cases outlined here, the problem arises that the
harm (whether valued monetarily or not) is not “personal” to
the plaintiff as it is in the intentional tort cases. Instead, the
private plaintiff is attempting to recover for harm to natural
349. See supra notes 306–14 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
351. See 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063–64 (2007).
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resources owned or managed by the public, in addition to his or
her own pecuniary loss. Therefore, even if obstacles to private
party standing and valuation are removed, it does not follow
that the plaintiff should be the beneficiary of all the nowincreased punitive damages that flow from the public harm. As
a result, there must be a method of apportioning the award of
punitive damages between the private party plaintiff and the
federal, state, or local government responsible for the resource.
Each of these approaches and concerns are discussed below.
1. Valuing Environmental Harm in the Absence of a State or
Federal Government Plaintiff
As the cases discussed in earlier Parts show, attempting to
value environmental harm is difficult.352 In some cases, however, valuation of harm is at least possible because a state or federal government, whether a plaintiff or not, has attempted to
value the harm through restoration costs or other economic indicators. Valuation should become more sophisticated as quantification of nonuse values for natural resources develops
through further refinement of CVM or new methods of valuation.353 As that happens, existence and option values of natural
resources can and should be added to restoration costs to value
total harm.354 In the meantime, courts should consider restoration costs in measuring total harm for purposes of reviewing
punitive damages awards, even if the court finds it inappropriate to award such costs to a private or local government
plaintiff as compensatory damages.
Private plaintiffs can enhance valuation techniques more
directly if legislatures expand qui tam provisions that are part
of federal and state false claims acts to supplement government
efforts to value and recover for environmental harm. Qui tam
provisions currently allow private parties to sue on behalf of
the federal or state government to recover stolen government
funds after giving notice of the suit to the government.355 As an
352. See supra Part III.C.2.
353. See supra notes 311–14 (discussing CVM for assessing nonuse values).
354. See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 A.2d 345,
401, 409–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding as a matter of first impression that the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act’s definition
of “cleanup and removal costs” gives the state the right to recover for “loss of
use” of natural resources injured or destroyed by a discharge in addition to the
costs of physical restoration).
355. Aaron R. Petty, Note, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 851, 863–70 (2006) (discussing history and
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incentive for private parties to bring such suits, this legislation
directs courts to award private plaintiffs between fifteen and
thirty percent of the funds recovered.356 The purpose of such
laws is to allow private attorneys general to supplement the
governments’ effort to combat fraud.357
State legislatures could enact statutes that similarly allow
private citizens to bring qui tam suits for conduct that violates
state or federal law and results in harm to the environment.
The legislation would allow the plaintiff to seek restoration
costs and/or loss of use damages based on CVM and other
methods. In addition, the legislation could provide for a split in
the recovery of any punitive damages, with the majority going
to the state and some portion going to the private plaintiff as
an incentive for bringing the lawsuit.358
Qui tam and split-recovery legislation would enhance the
citizen-suit provisions that exist under many federal and state
environmental laws by allowing private plaintiffs to recover financially as an incentive for bringing a case that attempts to
quantify harm to the environment. While the valuation would
not be “perfect” because of the inherent difficulties in valuing
environmental harm, it would be akin to the efforts to value
pain and suffering damages. Courts routinely award these
damages even though courts recognize that they do not serve to
“compensate” for the harm and do not value the harm economically.359 Although we have little ability to value such harm “in
the market,” we allow juries to place a dollar value on the loss
to recognize the significant nonmarket injury that has occurrent trends in qui tam actions).
356. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000) (providing that private parties can obtain
between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the recovery or settlement if the
government decides to proceed with the suit after notice, and between twentyfive and thirty percent of the recovery or settlement if the government decides
not to proceed with the suit); see The False Claims Act Legal Center, State
False Claims Acts, http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007)
(showing states with false claims acts and providing links to the text of such
laws); see also Petty, supra note 355, at 865–70 (discussing the recovery provisions of state and federal qui tam laws).
357. United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 967–68 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act exist to deter fraud,
return funds to the federal treasury, and vindicate the public interest); S. REP.
NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267 (“In the
face of sophisticated and widespread fraud, the Committee believes only a
coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this
wave of defrauding public funds.”).
358. See infra notes 403–08 and accompanying text.
359. See supra Part III.A.1.
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curred.360 Awards for both pain and suffering and harm to natural resources are necessary to create a legal system that recognizes that not all harm easily translates into economic
terms but still attempts to fashion justice with the legal tools
available.361 Under this framework, there would be no need to
depart from single-digit ratios in awarding punitive damages
because there would be a fuller valuation of the harm against
which to compare punitive damages for ratio purposes.
Even in the absence of new legislation, courts also have the
authority to use existing valuation methods to allow enhanced
punitive damages in private party actions. Three of the cases
discussed in Section III.B are instructive for other courts addressing cases involving environmental harm. In Grefer for example, there was no assessment of damage to natural resources
but there were other indicators of total harm.362 In reviewing
the punitive damages award, the court relied heavily on the estimated costs of restoration.363 By doing so, the court at least
approached a calculation of total harm to natural resources by
which to compare punitive damages. By using this more complete estimate of actual harm, a single-digit ratio, even at a 2to-1 ratio, did not risk undervaluing the harm or creating insufficient punishment and deterrence. The court allowed the
plaintiff to recover restoration costs as compensatory damages.
The court, however, could have refused to award restoration
costs as too speculative but still used those costs as its total
harm number in assessing punitive damages. Similarly, the
court in City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Dow Chem. Co.,
though it determined the city’s estimate for remediating the
groundwater was unrealistic, could also have used that esti360. See supra notes 325–26 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 325–26 and accompanying text; see also Levit, supra
note 97, at 179–80 (arguing that allowing recovery for nonpecuniary harm requires courts to be sensitive to the “real nature” of injuries and prevents a
“hopelessly inauthentic account of humanity” that would endure under a fiction where only physical injuries “actually hurt”); Margaret Jane Radin, Essay, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 74 (1993) (awarding compensation for pain and suffering allows the justice system to recognize
a wrong and signify its weightiness even though money “is unrelated to the
harm suffered”); Dobbins, supra note 97, at 885 (contending that allowing recovery of nonuse values as a part of natural resource damages serves to value
those losses in the same way as recovery for nonmarket pain and suffering
damages in tort suits).
362. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1147–52 (La. Ct. App.
2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007).
363. Id. at 1149–50.
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mate as the value of harm for purposes of calculating the ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory damages.364
The Exxon Valdez case is also consistent with this approach. Because state and federal governments had already recovered for environmental harm in a separate lawsuit, the
court did not include those amounts in the total harm value for
evaluating punitive damages.365 Instead, harm for purposes of
punitive damages consisted solely of actual and potential economic harm that resulted from the spill.366 It is clear though,
that in a case where there had been no separate recovery for
environmental harm to public resources, such harm should be
included in the amounts against which punitive damages are
measured. In this way, courts ensure a fuller valuation of environmental harm for purposes of assessing punitive damages
but avoid any double recovery of either compensatory or punitive damages.
In cases where valuation information is available to assess
total harm, there is a stronger argument for remaining within
single-digit ratios. Courts can recognize the nonmarket injury
to the environment, even if the plaintiff is not financially injured by the environmental harm, by including it as part of the
total harm against which punitive damages are measured.
Such judicial efforts would complement, rather than conflict
with, existing federal and state citizen suits that federal and
state statutes permit.367 No new legal framework is necessary
364. See Nos. 999345, 999643, 2006 WL 2346275, at *11 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 1, 2006); supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text.
365. In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (D. Alaska
2004) (discussing the natural resource damage settlement), vacated per curiam, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007),
cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied,
76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276); John Tomlin, Comment,
Waking the Sleeping Giant: Analyzing New Jersey’s Pursuit of Natural Resource Damages from Responsible Polluting Parties in the Lower Passaic River,
23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 235, 246–47 (2005–2006) (reporting that the contingent valuation method determined that the damages to natural resources from
the Exxon Valdez spill were $3 billion, which played a role in Exxon’s agreement to settle those claims).
366. In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 601 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W.
3224 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-219), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S.
Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 07-276).
367. See supra notes 274, 303 and accompanying text (discussing savings
clauses in federal environmental statutes and judicial recognition that Congress intended statutory citizen suits and common law actions to supplement
enforcement of federal environmental laws).
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to allow consideration of environmental harm in setting punitive damages, and such consideration would serve existing policy goals of enhancing enforcement of environmental laws as
well as punishing and deterring environmental wrongdoing.368
2. Recognizing Unvalued Environmental Harm Where
Valuation Is Difficult
In contrast to the prior approach, the alternate approach
outlined below attempts to use the analysis in the intentional
tort cases to promote punishment and deterrence objectives in
environmental harm cases where the court has recognized,
though not valued, total harm. In these cases, courts should
permit punitive damage verdicts with high single-digit ratios or
ratios exceeding single digits. There is some authority already
for this approach in existing case law. For instance, in the Exxon Valdez case, even though the district court was only valuing economic harm from the spill and a significant amount of
data was available, it remained unable to fully value the harm.
Even after including all voluntary payments by Exxon in the
total harm amount, “there was purely non-economic harm that
[could not] be quantified; there was harm which likely occurred
but ha[d] not yet been valued; and there was potential harm—
all flowing from the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.”369 The
court relied on this unvalued harm to justify a higher ratio of
punitive damages, thus following the approach of courts in the
intentional torts cases.370 While the Ninth Circuit disagreed
that the ratio should be as high as nearly 10-to-1, it did agree
that that total harm used to evaluate the reasonableness of the
punitive damages award should far exceed the compensatory
damages awarded in the case.371
The Johansen372 case, discussed supra, also exemplifies an
attempt to value harm beyond compensatory damages. In that
case, the court allowed a 100-to-1 ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages, reasoning that the compensatory damages did not sufficiently value the harm to the environment and
that the state had an interest in deterring environmental pollution.373 The court did not attempt to place a dollar value on the
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
In re The Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
Id. at 1104.
In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d at 624.
Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1337–38.
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state’s interest in protecting the environment or the actual environmental harm.374 Instead, it recognized the presence of the
invasion of the state’s interest, the existence of the harm, and
conducted its ratio analysis with that in mind.375 Such an approach avoids the concerns expressed by the State Farm majority of excessive punitive damages on top of excessive noneconomic damages.376 Here, the court does not award damages for
noneconomic harm, but the award of punitive damages still
serves its purposes.
A court adopting this approach must squarely address the
Court’s recent decision in Williams.377 In that case, the Court
limited the ability of the jury to consider harm to “nonparties”
in awarding punitive damages.378 Thus, Williams calls into
question a punitive damages award that is based in part on
unvalued harm to natural resources where those natural resources are not “represented” in the case by a governmental
entity with standing to seek relief for those damages. For the
reasons set forth below, however, Williams does not act as a bar
to courts awarding punitive damages that are enhanced (or not
reduced) based on unvalued environmental harm.
First, Williams does not prevent juries from taking into account harm to nonparties. Instead, it only prevents the jury
from considering such harm for purposes other than determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.379 As a result, because of the importance of the reprehensibility factor in
assessing punitive damages, the decision should not pose a bar
to allowing harm to natural resources to result in higher ratios
of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Instead, juries
can base punitive damages awards in part on unvalued harm to
natural resources so long as courts carefully instruct juries on
the limitations of the use of such unvalued harm.380
Second, and perhaps more important, Williams, like the
Court’s other punitive damages cases, implicitly assumes that

374. Id. at 1338–39.
375. Id.
376. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426
(2003).
377. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
378. Id. at 1063–64.
379. Id.
380. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (“Perhaps
the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”).
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the harm to “nonparties” can be valued and recovered as compensatory damages (whether economic or noneconomic) by multiple similarly situated plaintiffs against the same defendant,
resulting potentially in multiple punitive damages for the same
wrong.381 The line of cases ending with Williams addressed not
only cases with large punitive damage verdicts, but also cases
with large noneconomic compensatory damage verdicts that
can be recovered by multiple tort victims across the country.382
The problem in those cases is that there are too many available
plaintiffs who can seek damages; in the natural resource damage cases, there are often too few.383 Thus, the concerns present
in Williams do not necessarily exist in environmental harm
cases.
Third, environmental harm cases, just like the trespass
cases, are generally limited to discrete geographic areas and do
not involve injuries replicated thousands of times throughout
the state or country.384 Creating confusion on this point is the
fact that scholars often use the term “environmental torts”
broadly to describe not only claims for damage to the environment but also claims for personal injury resulting from exposure to pesticides, asbestos, contaminated soil and groundwater, and other hazardous products or wastes.385 In fact, scholars
381. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (“[T]o permit punishment for injuring
a nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive
damages equation.”).
382. Id. at 1060–62 (finding the punitive damages award violated due
process because the jury instructions allowed the jury to consider harm to
smokers across the state); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 419–20, 422 (2003) (concluding that the punitive damages award violated due process because it attempted to punish defendant for its “operations
throughout the country” which “bore no relation to the [plaintiffs’] harm”);
BMW, 517 U.S. at 564 (stating that the punitive damages were based, in part,
on nearly one thousand cars throughout the state that had fraudulently been
repainted).
383. See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text (discussing limitations
in federal and state enforcement of environmental laws).
384. Even in environmental harm cases involving large corporations such
as Exxon Mobil and Dow Chemical, the number of potential plaintiffs in a position to sue based on harm to the physical environment, even with loosened
standing requirements, is likely to be far less than the number of potential
plaintiffs in any nationwide consumer fraud or product liability action involving personal injury or emotional harm. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing
standing limitations for environmental harm cases).
385. See Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a
National Punitive Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613, 1621 (2005) (“As
with products liability claims, environmental injury claims hold the potential
for numerous plaintiffs to allege individual injuries arising out of a single act

KLASS_6FMT

152

12/13/2007 9:36 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:83

such as Kip Viscusi have included “environmental torts” in the
category of cases driving the need for judicial reform of punitive
damages.386 Based on these calls for reform, one might think
that the problem of multiple punishments would be a primary
concern in environmental harm cases.
A closer look at this claim reveals, however, that these
scholars are focusing not on private party claims for environmental harm, but on more traditional “toxic tort” claims involving personal injury.387 Such toxic tort cases raise the same concerns of large, nonpecuniary damages awards present in the
product liability and nationwide fraud cases that have been the
topic of significant scholarly attention,388 in addition to a focus
of the Supreme Court decisions in State Farm and Williams.389
The environmental toxic tort cases, however, should not be
so easily classified with the environmental harm cases that are
the subject of this Article. The environmental harm cases result
in unvalued harm precisely because there is a significant component of the injury (i.e., harm to natural resources) that, unlike pain and suffering, economic loss, or medical expenses, is
not personal to or “owned” by the plaintiff. The concern in the
toxic tort and other personal injury cases is that juries will
overvalue the damage due to the presence of a sympathetic
plaintiff and the use of open-ended jury instructions providing
little guidance in awarding nonpecuniary damages for pain and
or course of conduct on behalf of a single defendant.”); Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 27, 30, 39–43
(1987) (discussing “environmental harms” with reference to toxic tort cases
involving thousands of victims); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive
Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO.
L.J. 285, 285 (1998) (referring to “environmental” cases to discuss toxic tort
accidents leading to injury and death).
386. See Viscusi, supra note 385, at 285–86 (arguing for the elimination of
punitive damages for corporate risk and environmental decisions, but relying
primarily on “environmental” cases involving toxic tort accidents leading to
personal injury and death); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 19, 64–74 (2002) (basing conclusions on mock jury
data assessing “products liability and environmental damage torts” although
the only environmental case studied involved damage solely to public resources and was not brought by a private party).
387. See supra note 385.
388. See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages and Punishment for Individual Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 583, 583–91 (2003); Denemark, supra note 82, at 931; Gash, supra note
385, at 1613.
389. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412 (2003).
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suffering, loss of life, and the like.390 In many natural resource
damages cases, by contrast, there is no plaintiff able to seek
damages for harm to natural resources and, even when there
is, the legal system has struggled to develop a system to value
that damage.391 Thus, it is an error to include the environmental harm cases discussed in this Article as merely one type of
“environmental tort” contributing to the alleged “breakdown” of
the tort system.
In sum, the cases involving harm to natural resources are
significantly different than toxic tort, product liability, and other cases involving nationwide corporate misconduct that raise
the specter of a multiplicity of lawsuits with multiple and overlapping punitive damages awards.392 Because of these significant differences, the concerns raised in State Farm and Williams simply do not apply. Instead, environmental harm cases,
like the intentional tort cases, fall within their own discrete
category of cases that fit the exception to the State Farm singledigit ratio presumption.393 In the environmental harm cases,
the unvalued harm is not to “nonparties” who can bring their
own suits for compensatory and punitive damages, but to public
natural resources. Even if vindicated by state and federal governments, the awards often do not achieve full economic valuation.
C. APPORTIONING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
HARM CASES
This Section addresses problems of apportioning the damages awarded in environmental harm cases filed by a private
plaintiff attempting to recover punitive damages based not only
390. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of precision in jury instructions for awards of pain and suffering and other nonpecuniary damages).
391. See supra Part III.C (discussing the difficulty of bringing suits for
natural resource damages and valuing such damages).
392. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063–64 (invalidating a punitive damages
award to the wife of a smoker because of concern that the jury based the punitive damages award on harm to other smokers across the state); State Farm,
538 U.S. at 419–24 (stating that the punitive damages award was excessive
because it was based significantly on defendants’ nationwide misconduct with
regard to processing insurance claims rather than on conduct directed toward
the plaintiff ).
393. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (“Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate . . . that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
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on his or her own economic loss, but also on harm to public resources. In these cases, the plaintiff must establish whether or
not she will incur some or all of the restoration costs
representing the total harm inflicted by the defendant. If the
plaintiff cannot establish she will incur those costs, the plaintiff
should receive only some portion of the punitive damages, with
the remainder going to state or nonprofit environmental agencies responsible for the resource. Such apportionment is necessary to address concerns of plaintiff “windfalls” and ensure that
any punitive damages awarded based on “wrongs” to the public
go to the public. Despite the minimal precedent for such apportionment in environmental cases, the building blocks exist to
create a system of apportionment.
First, Catherine Sharkey has persuasively argued that we
should recognize that punitive damages contain a compensatory component in addition to the punishment and deterrence
components.394 According to Sharkey, these “compensatory societal damages” are a significant, but insufficiently acknowledged, aspect of punitive damages that serve the goal of redressing the harms caused by defendants beyond the individual
plaintiffs in any particular case.395 Sharkey focuses primarily
on single tortious acts by defendants that harm multiple victims and on torts which consist of repeated conduct affecting
multiple parties.396 In both types of cases, she suggests various
mechanisms to distribute a portion of punitive damages “not
only to the plaintiff but also to the society of similarly harmed
individuals.”397 These mechanisms include variations on punitive damages class actions,398 refinements to split-recovery
statutes,399 and judicial allocation of some portion of punitive
damages awards to state coffers in the absence of legislation.400
The judicial analysis in the intentional tort and environmental harm cases discussed in earlier Parts is consistent with
394. See Sharkey, supra note 31, at 350–52, 389–414.
395. Id. at 351–52.
396. Id. at 389.
397. Id. at 390.
398. Id. at 410–14.
399. Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah
all have statutes that require some percentage of punitive damages awards in
all or certain classes of cases to be paid to the state or an agency within the
state. Id. at 373, 375–80.
400. Id. at 380–86, 402–15 (discussing the judicial apportionment of punitive damages between the plaintiff and the state in the absence of controlling
legislation).
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Sharkey’s concept of compensatory societal damages. Throughout these cases, courts continually refer to the need for significant punitive awards to not only punish and deter defendants,
but to somehow compensate or value harm to society and to
protect individual rights and resources.401 Each of these cases
focuses on the state’s interest in the private dispute before the
court either in terms of protecting natural resources, deterring
similar wrongful conduct in the future, or both.402 It is not a
significant leap, however, to conceive of the state’s interest as a
compensatory one as well. At least in the environmental harm
cases, where the injury is to public resources, an award of punitive damages can, in addition to serving its traditional punitive
and deterrent purposes, serve to compensate the state for the
defendant’s violation of its interest. More tailored legislative
and judicial efforts to implement split-recovery of punitive
damages seem particularly applicable in these cases, where an
individual plaintiff lawsuit raises larger issues of harm to public environmental resources.
Building on this idea, several states have split-recovery
statutes where a certain percentage of punitive damages
awarded in all or certain classes of cases are paid to state
funds.403 Seven of the eight states with such statutes impose
split-recovery in all cases; whereas Georgia permits splitrecovery only in product liability cases.404 Alaska, Missouri,
and Utah require 50% of the punitive damages award to go to a
401. Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1338 (11th Cir.
1999) (allowing a ratio larger than single digits and focusing on the state’s interest in deterring environmental pollution); Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901
So. 2d 1117, 1137–38 (La. Ct. App. 2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007) (reviewing remediation estimates with reference to the state’s interest in cleaning up the property and serving as a trustee
for public natural resources); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d
154, 160–61 (Wis. 1997) (focusing on society’s interest in preserving the integrity of the legal system and protecting the interests of individual landowners in
awarding punitive damages).
402. Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1333, 1338–39; Grefer, 901 So. 2d at 1137–38;
Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 160–61.
403. See supra note 399.
404. Sharkey, supra note 31, at 377–78 (noting that Alaska, Indiana, Iowa,
Missouri, Utah, Oregon, and Illinois permit split-recovery in all cases and citing and quoting the relevant state statutes). In addition, since 2003, six states
have proposed legislation that would deny plaintiffs any portion of punitive
damages awards, although no state has yet enacted such legislation. See
Kelly-Rose Garrity, Note, Whose Award Is It Anyway?: Implications of Awarding the Entire Sum of Punitive Damages to the State, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 395,
395–96, 403 (2006).
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state fund; Oregon requires 60%; Georgia, Indiana, and Iowa
require 75%; and Illinois leaves the percentage to the discretion
of the trial court.405 In some states these amounts are deposited
in the general fund, while in others legislation directs that the
money go to civil reparations funds, criminal reparation funds,
and the like.406
Currently, none of these statutes apply specifically to cases
involving environmental harm. It would not be difficult, however, to amend these statutes or create others to ensure that a
portion of the punitive damages award in a private party environmental harm case goes to the state department of natural
resources or a pollution control agency where appropriate. In a
case where restoration costs make up a portion of compensatory
damages, like in Grefer, punitive damages based on that
amount should go to the state unless it is clear the private
plaintiff will be incurring those costs. Likewise, if damage to
natural resources is recognized in order to allow a ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages above single digits, but
that damage is not monetized like in Johansen, the court
should award the amount of punitive damages exceeding a single-digit ratio to the state unless the plaintiff takes responsibility for restoring the natural resources. In each of these cases,
the legislation should ensure that the plaintiff receives compensatory damages, punitive damages based on the plaintiff ’s
actual losses (economic loss and restoration costs incurred), a
full recovery of attorney’s fees,407 and some additional percentage of the punitive damages based on harm to public resources.
Allowing private plaintiffs to receive a percentage of the
“public” punitive damages is necessary to ensure that plaintiffs
have sufficient incentives to pursue claims that involve not only
private out-of-pocket losses, but also harm to public natural resources. The qui tam laws discussed earlier serve as precedent
for allowing private plaintiffs to bring suit on behalf of federal
or state governments and retain a portion of the proceeds.408
405. Sharkey, supra note 31, at 377–78.
406. Id. at 379–80.
407. Existing split-recovery legislation in some states already ensures that
the state does not receive its percentage of recovery until after the plaintiff ’s
attorneys fees are recovered from the total award. Id. at 378–79 (stating that
in most, but not all, states with split-recovery statutes, the percentage allocated to the state is calculated after all applicable costs and fees, including the
plaintiff ’s full contingency fee, are recovered by the plaintiff ).
408. See supra notes 355–57 and accompanying text.
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This incentive allows private parties to act on behalf of the environment and thus aid federal and state enforcement efforts.
This type of “split” could be available not only pursuant to
legislation but also through the courts’ inherent common law
authority.409 Sharkey details examples where courts have engaged in judicial split-recovery remedies in the absence of applicable legislation.410 Courts have directed some portion of punitive damages to specific state or nonprofit funds to mitigate
plaintiff windfalls, as well as to promote societal interests the
defendants violated.411 While critics may charge that such actions constitute inappropriate judicial activism, significant
support exists in legal theory and case law for courts’ use of
their common law authority to shape legal remedies in the absence of statutes to the contrary.412 As a result, courts can direct some portion of punitive damages awards to state or nonprofit funds for environmental restoration or protection when it
is clear that some of the harm, whether valued or not, is to public natural resources.
Notably, there are anecdotes, though not empirical data, of
juries who questioned whether they had authority to impose a
split-recovery scheme in environmental cases. In Grefer, for example, the jury foreperson sent a note to the trial court during
deliberations inquiring whether any of the punitive damages
award would “go to compensate the people in the community.”413 Likewise, in a 2002 trial involving environmental contamination and punitive damages in Minnesota, the jury foreperson sent a note to the trial court as follows:
Your Honor, for clarification purposes, would you please explain to us
“punitive damages.” Do we as a jury get to decide where and how the
funds are distributed? Meaning, can we specify that these funds must
be used to clean up this property? Or go to the [Minnesota Pollution

409. Sharkey, supra note 31, at 380–86.
410. Id.
411. Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp. 976, 1009 (D. Kan. 1984) (affirming
an award of $10 million in punitive damages to the plaintiff based on the defendant’s intentional acts of pollution, but holding the award in abeyance contingent upon the defendant’s agreement to undertake cleanup efforts); Sharkey, supra note 31, at 380–86 (citing Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 121–22, 144–46 (Ohio 2002) (remitting a $49 million
punitive damages award in a bad faith insurance claim case to $10 million and
awarding two-thirds of that amount, after attorneys fees, to a cancer research
fund)).
412. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 302, at 570; Sharkey, supra note 31, at 424.
413. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1150 n.26 (La. Ct. App.
2005), vacated sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007).
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Control Agency] to clean up the property, or do they go to [the plaintiff ] to use as they see fit (do they pocket the money)?414

In both these cases, the answer to the jury was that the
plaintiff, not the state or the community, would receive the full
amount of punitive damages.415 But was that the only possible
answer? I argue that it was not. Courts and legislatures can
implement split-recovery of punitive damages in order to allow
optimal punishment and deterrence of defendants without resulting in plaintiff windfalls.
Indeed, in the absence of judicial or legislative implementation of split-recovery, there is evidence that juries will attempt to “do justice” using whatever tools they are given. Empirical studies have shown that mock jurors will inflate their
compensatory damages awards if they are denied the opportunity to award punitive damages or if caps are placed on punitive damages.416 In this way, jurors “use compensatory judgments to seek retribution or promote specific deterrence or
general deterrence.”417 Because of the serious harm to public
natural resources in many environmental cases involving punitive damages, such cases run a significant risk of jurors conflating compensatory and punitive damages if the punitive damages can only be based on the economic loss of the private
plaintiff.
Legislative and judicial action to implement split-recovery
of punitive damages in environmental harm cases thus will
414. Transcript of Proceedings at 2–3, Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom,
2006 WL 305279 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2002) (No. 99-CV-1833 JMR/FLN).
415. Grefer, 901 So. 2d at 1150 n.26; Transcript of Proceedings at 2–3,
Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., 2006 WL 305279 (No. 99-CV-1833 JMR/FLN).
416. Sharkey & Klick, supra note 82, at 1–2 (discussing findings that the
adoption of punitive damage caps leads to statistically significant increases in
compensatory damages awards and citing studies showing similar inflation of
compensatory awards where mock jurors were prohibited from awarding punitive damages); see Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 447 (Wis. 1980)
(“[I]f punitive damages are not allowed, juries [will] give vent to their desire to
punish the wrongdoer under the guise of increasing the compensatory damages, particularly those awarded for pain and suffering.” (citing 2 FOWLER V.
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1300 (1956))).
417. Sharkey & Klick, supra note 82, at 3 (quoting Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 315 (1999)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Catherine Sharkey, Crossing the PunitiveCompensatory Divide, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., forthcoming Nov.
2007) (discussing how juries use compensatory damages to punish defendants
when caps are placed on punitive damages).
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serve multiple, positive goals. First, it will ensure that the punitive and deterrent purposes of punitive damages are fully
implemented by basing the punitive damages award on the total harm, whether incurred by the private plaintiff or the public.418 Second, it will provide some measure of compensation to
the absent public plaintiff who, for lack of resources, politics, or
other reasons is not present as a plaintiff to protect the natural
resources in question. Third, it will provide additional incentives for plaintiffs to bring suits to protect environmental resources, in addition to recovering their related private losses. If
plaintiffs know that they can obtain attorneys fees, out-ofpocket losses, as well as a portion of the “public” punitive damages, potential plaintiffs will have sufficient incentive to bring
suit and thus act as private attorneys general without the corresponding public concern of inappropriate windfall awards.
Last, it will encourage courts and juries to impose punitive
damages based on a reprehensibility analysis that includes “total” harm, rather than merely the plaintiff ’s compensatory
damages.419
Finally, this more nuanced approach to punitive damages
will further illuminate the fact that a unitary approach to punitive damage assessments is inappropriate. As shown in Part II,
the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence centers around the
fear of excessive nonpecuniary damages and excessive total
awards in products liability cases and other cases involving nationwide harm. These concerns have little place in most environmental harm cases, where uncertainties in valuation more
often result in undervaluation of harm rather than excessive
damages. If courts more fully recognize harm that is difficult to
value and address this issue explicitly, they will properly use
the flexibility the Supreme Court created in BMW and State
Farm in their review of jury awards for punitive damages in
cases involving environmental harm.
CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of punitive damages has been significantly transformed in little more than a decade. Where punitive damages were once almost exclusively the province of jur418. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text (discussing recognized
purposes of punitive damages).
419. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063–64 (2007)
(allowing harm to the public and nonparties to be considered as part of the reprehensibility guidepost of punitive damages).
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ies and state courts, the Supreme Court’s involvement in this
area has now brought punitive damages awards under exacting
federal constitutional due process review. Throughout the Supreme Court’s journey in this area, judicial and public attention
has focused on the billion-dollar punitive damages awards
against large corporations arising from nationwide conduct, or
punitive awards based on large, nonpecuniary compensatory
damages awards. This focus has resulted in insufficient attention to cases in which harm to individual rights, public rights,
or public resources remains partially or wholly unvalued. This
Article attempts to shed light on these latter cases through the
study of intentional tort and environmental harm cases and
provides the beginnings of a framework for correcting the undervaluation of environmental harm. If courts can attempt to
value or at least acknowledge harm that a compensatory damages award does not currently measure, they can better implement the Supreme Court’s due process objectives, while still retaining the effectiveness of punitive damages in deterring and
punishing wrongful conduct.

